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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
In the last twenty years the introduction of electronic trading platforms in derivative exchanges 
has played the principal role in the change of the financial markets’ structure.  The traditional 
open-outcry auctions have been substituted by the limit order book mechanism, whose main 
benefit has been to improve consistently the pre-trade transparency allowing traders to gain a 
real-time access to the top 𝑛 levels of depth of the contracts listed. The main goal of the thesis 
is to investigate whether this improved pre-trade transparency facilitates price discovery and 
helps market participants in forecasting short-term price movements. In particular, the authors 
focus their attention on the incremental information content of the limit order book, over and 
above the information traditionally available in a dealer market. We construct imbalance 
measures to describe the current status of the book in the limit buy and sell orders beyond the 
best quote. Then, in a repetitive regression framework we demonstrate that these variables are 
suitable in explaining future short term returns. For our knowledge similar analyses have been 
performed only in stock or bonds markets, the paper instead test data on a power futures contract 
traded at the European Energy Exchange. 
 
The thesis is composed as follows: section 2 and section 3 introduce the limit order book as the 
main trading tool in an order-driven venue and the importance of data visualization. The third 
section provides us with an overview of the literature on the book depth analysis and it presents 
the principal indicators used to describe the order book shape. An introductory presentation of 
electricity markets is assessed in section 5. The last section investigates the additional 
information content of the book, explaining the methodology and showing the empirical results 
of the simulation example. 
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2. THE LIMIT ORDER BOOK MECHANISM 
 
Preliminaries 
Until the mid-90s the majority of financial trades took place in quote-driven marketplaces 
where large market makers centralize buy and sell orders by publishing the prices at which they 
are willing to buy or sell the traded asset. They provide immediacy to the market, i.e. they 
continuously provide liquidity on demand to anyone. Of course, this liquidity service could be 
valuable only if they sell at prices higher than those at which they buy; the difference between 
the two best quotes is the well-known bid-ask spread. That profit counterbalances the risk of 
acquiring an undesirable inventory position or for being subject to the adverse selection 
problem, that is encountering other traders who are better informed about the asset value and 
who gain a lot by trading repeatedly with the market maker. 
The entire process is nowadays become much more flexible thanks to the introduction of the 
limit order book mechanism, where every player has the option of posting buy and sell orders 
at his preferable price. We therefore move from quote-driven to electronic order-driven markets 
in which a trading algorithm tries to match all the upcoming orders as they come. A Limit Order 
Book (LOB) is defined as a set of queues, each of which consists of all the outstanding active 
buy or sell orders in a market at a specified price and at a particular point in time. An order is 
considered active if the algorithm is not able to find a match for it immediately. It remains active 
until it becomes matched to another incoming order or it is cancelled. 
The majority of the most relevant trading venues has already adopted this dynamic: the 
Helsinki, Hong Kong, Shenzhen, Swiss, Tokyo, Toronto, and Vancouver Stock Exchanges all 
now operate as pure Limit Order Book. Other, such as the New York Stock Exchange, 
NASDAQ, and the London Stock Exchange operate with a hybrid Limit Order Book system. 
Thanks to the technological progresses, the traders have almost real time access to the huge 
amount of information contained in a limit order book and these detailed historical time series 
pave the way to further researches to test economic theories or statistical regularities. Analysing 
the data can give us an insight into the best practises to follow in a given market situation. 
Furthermore, we can learn how to execute optimally an order strategy or how to minimize the 
market impact after an order has been posted. From the investment companies’ point of view, 
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studying the data patterns can help designing better automated trading algorithms or assessing 
market stability. 
 
Modelling a Limit Order Book 
Various models have been proposed that investigate the limit order book dynamics and it is 
possible to classify them in two main branches. Drawing from economics the Perfect 
Rationality approaches consider LOBs as a series of sequential games due to the behaviour of 
individual traders, who are driven by their own information and try to exploit it to maximize 
their utility. On the opposite side many mathematicians support the Zero Intelligence 
methodologies where aggregate order flows are treated as random, that is they are governed by 
stochastic processes. In both cases researchers have to deal with two main difficulties: the state-
space complexity, where the state space is the set of values which a process can take, and the 
feedback and coupling. In addition to the traders’ actions depending on the current order book 
state, the book status itself clearly varies according to the traders’ choices. These mutual 
dependences induce feedback between the LOB and the agents’ behaviour. Indeed, it has been 
empirically demonstrated that the current order flows depend on both the previous flows and 
on the set of all active orders in a market at time t. Also, the order flow creates a strong coupling 
between the best bid and the best ask. The top ask level determines a boundary condition for 
buy limit order placement because any buy order placed at or above the best ask partially 
matches immediately. A similar role is played by the best bid on the demand side. Therefore, 
the main goal is to design a model that defines appropriately this conditional behaviour and at 
the same time simplifies the evolving dimensionality of the state space. 
 
Market and Limit Orders 
Describing more in details the features that characterize a limit order book, we should start from 
the order types. Essentially a trader can submit a market order or a limit order: the former finds 
a match immediately upon submission, the latter instead does not and it becomes an active 
order. The term ‘limit’ is used basically only to emphasize whether an incoming order triggers 
an immediate matching or not. Consider a buy order 𝑥 that is defined by the vector (𝑝௫, 𝑤௫, 𝑡௫), 
where 𝑝௫ is the submission price, 𝑤௫ is the order size and 𝑡௫ is the precise moment in time of 
submission. 
 
5 
 
The buy order price could be: 
 𝑝௫ < 𝑏(𝑡), where 𝑏(𝑡) is the best bid price, i.e. the highest state price among active buy 
order at time t or mathematically 𝑏(𝑡) = max 𝑝௫ , 𝑥 𝜖 𝐵(𝑡) where 𝐵(𝑡) is the set of all 
limit buy orders. In this case the order 𝑥 is a limit order, it does not change the best bid 
price 𝑏(𝑡) and it becomes active increasing the depth of the LOB; 
 
 𝑏(𝑡) < 𝑝௫ < 𝑎(𝑡), where 𝑎(𝑡) is the lowest sell price, 𝑎(𝑡) = min 𝑝௫, 𝑥 𝜖 𝐴(𝑡) where 
𝐴(𝑡) is the set of all limit ask orders. Then the limit buy order becomes active and it 
narrows the bid-ask spread; 
 
 𝑝௫ ≥ 𝑎(𝑡), the order is a market order and, depending to its size, immediately upon 
arrival it matches against one or more active sell orders. This match occurs at the highest 
price available in the market. If the order size is bigger than that of the best active sell 
limit order, any residual size is considering for matching to the next highest priority 
order. 
 
Ultimately, the LOB bid-ask spread can be considered as the measure of how highly the market 
values the immediacy and certainty associated with the market orders versus the waiting and 
uncertainty associated with limit orders. Indeed, Copeland and Galai (1983) state that a limit 
order can be considered as a derivative contract written to all market participants. These options 
are free since the writer does not get any explicit premium, but rather receives an implicit gain 
if the limit price is hit and his contract is executed at better terms. 
An order can also be classified on the basis of its aggressiveness. A limit order is considered 
aggressive whenever it improves the best bid or ask quote and accordingly when it shifts all 
depth levels on that side. Differently, a passive limit order is an order that is posted behind the 
market, i.e. its limit price is smaller than the current best quote. It does not change the prevailing 
quote and it affects only the depth. Such an approach gives the trader total control over the 
execution price, but it is completely uncertain when or even if the order will be executed. The 
investor shall then wait for the market to move in his or her favour and therefore a passive 
trading strategy cannot fulfil a requirement of immediacy or that the matching of a given shares 
size will be completed within a specified time period. Also, a market order can be defined as 
aggressive if it walks up the book, that is when its size is bigger than the size of the opposite 
prevailing quote and consequently all depth levels and the best quote shift. Hence, even if the 
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agent is certain of the trade, this large market order causes a substantial negative impact on the 
market, worsening the execution price relative to the current market quote. 
In accordance with the specific exchange rules, an order may be affected by more detailed 
information regarding the order execution, such as price- and quantity-related instructions, 
duration of commitment, time of expiration, visibility and the terms of any principal-agent 
obligation. For example, a pegged strategy involves orders that adjust their limit price according 
to the changes of the best quotes. Automatically correcting the price to the best bid or ask, these 
orders remains competitive relative to the other passive orders and therefore they increase the 
likelihood to be filled. 
Once an order has been submitted, the matching algorithm assigns it a priority within each price 
level. The most common system is built on a price-time basis, that means a trader gets the 
precedence whenever his or her order is placed at a better price than the remaining active orders. 
If then two orders share the same price, whoever places it earlier gets the priority. Another 
mechanism is pro-rata, whenever a tie occurs and the aggregated bid size exceeds the 
aggregated offer size, each order is partially filled proportional to the fraction of depth available. 
Since placing order with a bigger size than the desirable one may help in gain priority, agents 
face a huge problem in deciding the optimal size. As for the pro-rata, there is also the price-size 
mechanism that rewards traders for providing liquidity to the market: among those at the best 
price, the active order with larger size is chosen. 
 
Hidden Liquidity 
A LOB does not always reveal fully the trading intentions of the whole market. Once a 
participant takes choices using the actual book status, it has to consider some issues like 
incomplete sampling and hidden liquidity. Or, more simply, it could be the case that some 
traders do not show their preferences by submitting orders only when it is strictly necessary. 
Some electronic venues do not show all the liquidity available in the market because the book 
displays only a set of prices within a predefined range. The displayed liquidity may also be 
affected by how fast new orders become visible, the frequency and the choice of parameter 
(every T-second, trade-by-trade, event-by-event) with which the LOB is updated are very 
relevant. Some other exchanges permit to personalize the own book. Through a bilateral 
agreement a trader can define a block-list of other traders with whom he or she is unwilling to 
trade. Therefore, his or her book shows only the active orders of the traders with whom it is 
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possible to trade. Even if the book does not suffer from latency issue and it displays all active 
orders at whatever price, some exchanges permit the submission of iceberg orders, i.e. large 
volume orders that are publicly visible only partially. After the visible part has been matched 
by an incoming market order, depending on the venues another part of equal size becomes 
public or the hidden portion that has not been filled is cancelled. 
In the last decade a phenomenon has increased over and over: the so-called Dark Pools, trading 
venues without pre-trade transparency. These exchanges allow traders to submit large orders 
completely anonymously and without revealing, sometimes also specifying, any price. The 
matching algorithm can vary a lot, some dark pools are essentially standard LOBs where all 
active orders are hidden. In other cases a traditional exchange is taken as reference and the dark 
pool simply replicates it, matching the hidden orders on the basis of the prices of the principal 
market. Most of the time transactions in these pools are carried out only for speculative reasons. 
Another difficulty in modelling a LOB is to deal with the volatility, that is the measure of the 
variability of returns of the traded asset. Generally, an asset with high volatility is expected to 
register higher price changes in a given period of time than a low volatile asset. It is easy to 
understand why finding an unbiased estimate is fundamental in selecting assets for constructing 
a portfolio with a low risk exposure. This task has become more difficult since many traders 
started to place limit orders and immediately cancel them in order to discover the hidden 
liquidity in the market. This practice causes the prices to change very fast, but does not have a 
meaningful impact or any economic belief behind and that is why we can call this variability in 
prices microstructure noise. Nowadays there are completely automated algorithms expressly 
programmed to submit and cancel orders in order to discover the traders’ intentions. 
 
Resolution Parameters 
A limit order book structure and the amount of completed transactions are highly defined by its 
resolution parameters, that are the lot size and the tick size. The lot size is the minimum amount 
of the tradable asset that can be exchanged. It directly affects a trader submission strategy, in 
particular when he or she decides to split a large order in smaller ones to impact as little as 
possible to the final trading price. Instead, the thick size represents the cost that an agent has to 
bear if she or he wants to gain priority, in other word it is the minimum price increment that an 
asset is allowed to move. In October 2016 NYSE launched the Tick Size Pilot Program that has 
widened the minimum quoting and trading increment for small capitalization stocks, which 
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began trading in five-cent increments instead of one-cent increments. The goal of the pilot is to 
boost liquidity and to increase the percentage of order that get filled by increasing the spreads 
for thinly-traded stocks. 
 
Opening and Closing Auctions 
We conclude our fast review of the mode of operation that rules an electronic venue presenting 
another feature that characterizes many exchanges. The open and the close of markets are 
extremely relevant event for traders and regulators. The opening period absorbs all the 
information gathered overnight and it plays a fundamental role in aggregating them and in the 
price discovery; the closing price is the price at which investors make decisions regarding their 
investment portfolios. In fact, it represents a reference point for determining performance over 
a specific time frame. That is the reason why at the beginning and end of the trading day, many 
markets, for instance Paris, Frankfurt and London, suspend the continuous limit order trading 
to match orders and instead use an auction system. The main purposes of call action involve the 
sharpening of price discovery, the enhancement of quantity discovery, the reduction of trading 
costs and the avoidance of price manipulation. Despite the widespread use, the call auction 
mechanisms show remarkable differences on the world’s major exchanges, showing 
disagreement about its optimal design. In general, in both open and close auction traders can 
view and place orders as usual but no match occurs. Therefore, it could also happen a cross 
market situation, that occurs when the best limit buy price is higher than the minimum limit ask 
price. After having collected all orders, for each price 𝑝 with positive depth the matching 
algorithm calculates the total volume that can be traded between buy orders with a price equal 
to or greater than 𝑝 and the corresponding sell orders with a price equal to or less than 𝑝. The 
algorithm then maximizes the total volume defining the uncrossing price at which all trades 
take place, in contrast to standard continuous limit order book trading. 
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3. DATA VISUALIZATION 
 
Visualizations have often acted as means of communicating results, by translating and 
summarizing multi-dimensional data into a form visually accessible to users. This ease of 
communication comes from the ability of visuals to both help externalize the memory 
associated with the data, and to more closely represent a user’s mental model of the data. This 
efficiency can free the user’s memory to support further, necessary, cognitive operations or 
tasks. Indeed, the design goal for a data analysis system is to facilitate the knowing-learning-
understanding process on users, freeing time and energy for them to pursue insights or 
iteratively explore the data. 
In this chapter we present the market data structure and we show some simple examples on how 
data visualization is a fundamental tool for building intuition and enabling exploratory data 
analysis. 
 
Market data are classified on the basis of the amount of information they provide.  
 Basic data is known as Level I and it includes real-time best ask and bid, the volume 
available at these highest quotes, the information regarding the last transaction, the price 
and its size, and ultimately the high and low price for the day;  
 
 Level II data provides much more comprehensive and in depth information, it indeed 
discloses the full limit order book;  
 
 A third layer of data information, sometimes incorrectly described as Level III, is 
restricted to venue’s member firms that operate as registered market makers. It gives 
the ability to enter quotes, execute orders and send attached confirmations or particular 
instructions. 
 
Visualizing correcting the huge set of data held in a limit order book gives potentially enormous 
benefits to traders because it provides a balanced portrait of the dynamic and static components 
of the market system. Analysing the charts market participants can not only watch the evolution 
of the spread and find different liquidity at each price level, but also identify patterns such as 
intraday momentum or price changes due to the order book activity. On the following paragraph 
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we review the development of data visualization taking into account that displaying Level II 
data requires at least three dimensions: price levels, total size at each level and time dimension. 
Only most recent tools allow to combine uniformly these three different sides. 
 
Climbing The Market and Bar Chart 
Figure 1 shows the most classical representation of a limit order book where it is illustrated a 
snapshot of current traders’ intentions to trade taken at the last available time. The displayed 
numbers come from the dataset we have analyzed in the next chapters, it involves the Futures 
contract Germany Baseload 2018 traded at the European Energy Exchange. On the left the so-
called “Climbing the Market” shows the different levels and the total volume lined up at each 
price to buy or sell, while on the right the bar chart displays more intutively the same data. 
Whenever a new order is submitted or an active one is filled/cancelled the graph is updated. 
The bid ask spread is calculated taking the difference between prices on the top of the book, 
therefore in this case the spread is 0.05. 
 
 
Figure 1. Climbing The Market and Bar Chart – Germany Baseload 2018, EEX 
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The shape of the market depth bars gives some hints about the conditions of the market. In an 
ordered and liquid market, for example, the sizes on both sides increase uniformly among 
throughout the first five levels, above and below the inside spread, forming a triangle shape as 
shown in Figure 2, chart 1. Other times it could be the case of an unbalanced market, where the 
number of buyers and sellers in the market are not equal. The fictional situation displayed in 
Figure 2,chart 2 shows a high selling pressure that will most likely cause prices to weaken. In 
the following sections of the thesis we investigate further and in a more quantitative way this 
possibility. 
 
 
Figure 2. Ordered and Dawnward Bias Market – fictional situation 
 
Support and Resistance Levels 
Bar charts are very useful also in determining support or resistance levels which are particular 
market depth levels significantly larger than those surrounding them, respectively on the buy 
and ask side. In both Figure 1 and 2 we can notice a support and a resistance level, highlighted 
by the red circles, respectively at the price 30.90 and 31.35. The reason why these price levels 
are formed is not completely clear; the behavioural economics suggests that people have a 
psychological bias to place orders at numbers which they see as being more prominent than 
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others, for instance at round numbers. Thus traders tend to place their stop loss1 and take profit 
orders there and this causes the formation of support/resistance areas. 
These outliers can signal areas where in the near future significant buying or selling will take 
place as active pending orders are matched, causing the price movement to slow down. 
Moreover, these high concetration zones will propel a market in either direction depending on 
the fact that the level is taken out or defended. Indeed, considering Figure 2, if prices reach the 
resistance at the 31.35 price level where many sellers are waiting, the price movement will 
pause and due to the new high selling pressure the price could get pushed down. Conversely, if 
prices touch a support level, they would probably bounce back. In fact, when the level is 
reached, the stop-loss/take-profit orders are triggered causing a pressure on the opposite 
direction. Also the short-termins of the profit-oriented traders can be accounted among the 
reasons why high concentration zones are formed and prices bounce back. 
Before being broken, support and resistance levels are normally tested many many times 
causing the prices to vary inside that interval. Once such levels have been overtaken, they 
assume new roles. If prices go deeper than a support level, most likely that level will become a 
new resistance level on the ask side. The opposite holds as well. From a pure economic 
perspective the breaching through a support/resistance level can be caused by a new trigger in 
the market, such as corporate announcements of the underlying company or policy changes. In 
addition to this, we can consider also market participants’ post-regret. For instance, the 
investors who sold the stock close to the resistance are in an awkward position once the price 
has cut through this level and then they are waiting to buy it back once the price falls back to 
the previous resistance level, which is become the new support level. 
In a very liquid venue, such as forex or criptocurrency markets, these high concentration areas 
could be just attempts to manipulate the market. A common technique is to put a large bid order, 
a bid wall, in order to move market sentiment. Let us consider Figure 3 that represents three 
consecutive snapshots of the bid side of a bitcoin order book, taken from the dead Mt.Gox 
platform. Within the scope of affecting orders distribution a larger order to buy is set at the limit 
price $123. The traders whose limit orders lag below that level observe their execution 
probabibility to fall down and then they most likely move their limit orders ahead of the wall. 
After the market reaction the initial agent removes the bid wall, however the newer orders 
                                                          
1 A stop loss order specifies a particular price. The order is executed at the best available price 
once a bid or offer is made at that particular price or a less-favourable price. 
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remain at levels above $123 and the buying pressure increases since new walls, composed by 
legitimate orders, have been created. There are many reasons to put into practice such a strategy, 
for instance reducing an inventory position or to create a buying support. In the former case the 
manipulator wants to obtain a higher average price in selling, while in the latter he wants to 
avoid a rude market downward due to the arrival of a high sell order. 
 
 
Figure 3. Bid Wall – BTC/USD, Mt.Gox platform on April 2013 
 
Depth and Candlesticks Charts 
Additional to the “Climbing the market” and “Bar chart” tools, traditional trading platforms 
provide the client also with some other visualization methods such those illustrated in Figure 4 
and Figure 5. 
 
 
Figure 4. Depth chart – BTC/ZAR on 1st April 2015, Luno platform 
Size Bid Size Bid Size Bid
3,6241 126 3,6241 126 3,6241 126
177,2617 125 845,6244 125 845,6244 125
268,3822 124 1943,4425 124 1943,4425 124
5687,6996 123 5687,6996 123 287,6996 123
480,1753 122 80,1753 122 80,1753 122
823,8882 121 223,8882 121 223,8882 121
1528,1493 120 528,1493 120 528,1493 120
534,7107 119 534,7107 119 534,7107 119
989,7167 118 989,7167 118 989,7167 118
926,0372 117 926,0372 117 926,0372 117
Bid wall placed Orders move above wall Wall removed
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The depth chart illustrates the cumulative sum of the volumes available at each price level. 
Again, it is helpful in determining the ability of a particular market to absorb large sell/buy 
orders without the underlying price moving in either direction, in discovering the next probable 
price move and in detecting support or resistance levels. 
The solid candlesticks chart is a classical representation of the evolution over time of the 
underlying price. It does not show all the information contained in the order book, but it is a 
support tool valuable to keep in mind also the time dimension. In such a chart, each bar 
represents the four main pieces of information for the time interval considered (in Figure 5 each 
candlestick corresponds to one trading day): the open, high, low and close values. The filled 
portion of the candlestick is called “the body”, while the long thin lines above and below the 
body are called “shadows” and they represent the high/low ranges. The high is marked by the 
top of the upper shadow, the low by the bottom of the lower shadow. The extremities of the 
body instead represent the open and the close values. As it can be easily seen in the figure 
below, the red colour stays for a selling pressure where the close is lower than the open. Vice 
versa, further the close is above the open longer the green area is. The grey bars on the 
background indicate the whole volume traded in the considered time interval. 
 
 
Figure 5. Candlesticks chart – BTC/ZAR, Luno platform 
 
Heatmap 
The charting tools we presented so far are limited in displaying instantaneous information and 
even combining them with the filled candlesticks chart they just provide a filtered or aggregated 
perspective. This lack of transparency does not allow traders to have a real insight into the 
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market microstructure and to understand more complex dynamics involving price triggered 
strategies, algorithm activities, big players’ moves or hidden liquidity discovery. 
It is really important to highlight that the use of data visualization is not only fundamental in 
real-time sessions when a trader has to take immediate decisions or to test whether his or her 
own strategy is effective or not, but also in early stages when cleaning and checking the data 
accuracy is essential to develop a new strategy or to improve an existing one. Moreover, since 
the electronic trading has extensively depleted the ability of market participants to self-regulate 
themselves by hiding traders’ identities and allowing manipulative practises to go more easily 
unrecognized, visualizations are also valuable tools for supporting a range of activities within 
the regulatory sphere including monitoring, enforcement and general oversight. 
In order to solve the above mentioned issues in the last three years there has been developed a 
new visualization tool: the heatmap, whose real innovation has been to include a historical 
representation of the whole order book. In addition, previous tools have the common 
shortcoming to consider only a small set of the all data available in an order book, the heatmap 
overcomes it by giving the market participants a full insight to the whole market activity and it 
consists of 100% of the market data at a glance. 
 
 
Figure 6. Heatmap – Germany Baseload 2018, EEX 
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It is constructed using a rectangular tiling of a data matrix. This tiling eases the inspection of 
three dimensional data using rows, columns, and a third attribute, colour, as it changes with 
respect to the first two. This allows large data matrices to be displayed effectively on a high-
resolution colour images. 
The heatmap showed in Figure 6 allows a trader to scrutinize liquidity expansion and 
contraction over a selected period of time. It is updated very frequently, indeed it records and 
visualizes every change in the order book by displaying it on a scale of different colours. Those 
colours are applied at specific price levels: the darker blue shades mark areas with a low number 
of resting orders while brighter (or warmer) shades mark price levels of higher liquidity. The 
green and red dots indicate the occurrence of a match, respectively initiated by a buy or a sell 
action.  
Moreover, the traditional depth view can only provide continuously updated numerical 
representations of the market. For all those traders that use the depth of the market for trading, 
watching tick by tick market changes can be tiresome, time-consuming and prone to errors. 
This technology gives a clear view of how the entire limit order book and traded volume evolve 
over time, enabling a faster and deeper understanding of the market dynamics. 
Also, when a user sees an abundant size liquidity in the individual price levels, he or she cannot 
gauge with old-fashioned platforms how long is it in the market or how it was changed during 
the past 1 hour or how it reacts to price movements. Most traders are focused on the volume 
that is being traded, which is the past. 
Consider now an upward trending market as illustrated in Figure 7 and notice how the heatmap 
helps in following and illustrating the context of volume and liquidity evolution. The chart 
shows the situation of the E-mini Nasdaq 100 Index Dec 2017 on 17th October. In this case the 
heatmap uses a grey colour scale for indicating liquidity, where brighter shades indicate more 
resting orders. The dots instead represent the volume that has been traded in a pre-selected time 
period: the bigger the dot the much more trades have occurred. Again the colours green and red 
stay for buy and sell orders. 
In an up-trending market we usually see more aggressive volume on the buy side trading at 
higher highs. Looking at the 5 minutes interval after 10.45 a.m. we can notice more aggressive 
buying pulling the market up into newer highs. Indeed the dots are larger than previous and 
next intervals and they are mainly green coloured. At the same time there is less volume and 
less aggressive selling pressure at the higher lows. The increasing path is followed by a limited 
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sideways move. Zooming further, the same pattern, buying volume and sideways action, is 
repeated many times as illustrated by yellow circles. This is indicating that the trend has started 
lifting the offer into new levels. Also, it can be interpreted as a signal of a near-future price 
increase as it actually does between 11.15 and 11.20 a.m. It interesting how this behaviour is 
related with liquidity. The targets are high liquidity areas. Once the price reaches those zones, 
large transactions take place and the market goes sideways for a bit. Meanwhile the liquidity 
flips from the offer over the bid supporting the breakout to the upside. 
 
 
Figure 7. E-mini Nasdaq 100 Index 100 Dec 2017, CME 
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4. BOOK DEPTH ANALYSIS 
 
4.1 LITERATURE REVIEW 
In the literature there are three closely related branches which concern with the main topic we 
are presenting. The first involves the market transparency, that is how much information traders 
can retrieve from the process of trading. In particular, the degree of pre-trade transparency 
determines how much order-flow information is available. The second considers the choice of 
order type, market or limit order, and how the structure of the limit order book and agents’ 
preferences affects it. The last connected theme examines the information content of the LOB, 
that is whether its structure is informative regarding the future price movements.  
 
Pre-trade Transparency 
Over the last two decades global financial markets have been widely improved the disclosure 
of limit order book, increasing considerably the pre-trade transparency. This higher availability 
has significantly affected the information contained in the market depth. Indeed, the 
accessibility of pre-trade information on the trading intention of other participants influences 
the pattern of market reactions and agents’ behaviour such as return and volatility. That is the 
reason why substantial attention has been given to higher disclosure of data in academic 
research. Regarding the question of whether it facilitates price discovery, mixed evidence have 
been found by the extant researches. Baruch (2005) designed a theoretical model showing that 
an open limit order book enhances both liquidity and price efficiency. Confirming those 
findings, Boehmer, Saar, and Yu (2005) discovered that transaction prices started to deviate 
less from the efficient prices once New York Stock Exchange adopted the open book 
mechanism. Bortoli et al. (2006) investigated the effect of the increased market disclosure, from 
the best price level to the top three levels, for the four most actively traded future contracts in 
the Sidney Futures Exchange in January 2001. Their attention was on the trading behaviour and 
liquidity. They showed that the depth decreases importantly at the best bid and ask level while 
the very small change in BBO spread was not significant at all. Their result suggested also a 
relevant increase in the use of aggressive market orders. On the other hand, Madhavan, Potter, 
and Weaver (2005) stated that a greater pre-trade transparency does not guarantee an 
improvement in the overall market quality. Indeed, they found that the disclosure of the top four 
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price levels in April 1990 at the Toronto Stock Exchange caused larger spreads and higher 
volatility, increasing the transaction costs and eroding liquidity. 
 
The Choice of Order Type 
As seen also before, one of the fundamental functions of a financial market is the price 
discovery process. Private information is incorporated into prices through the choices of the 
informed traders, who can decide to submit market or limit orders in their dynamic strategies. 
If they trade employing limit orders, their superior knowledge is likely reflected in the book, 
especially when the orders are passive (away from the inside market). If, however, informed 
agents use market orders, the levels of the book beyond the best bid and best ask may not 
include any additional useful information. 
Early microstructure models such as Glosten (1994), Rock (1996) and Seppi (1997) implicitly 
assumed that the limit order book cannot possibly be informative for the evolution of future 
prices. They indeed considered limit orders posted by uninformed market participants as free 
options susceptible to being picked off by later better-informed investors. They argued that 
informed traders enter the market aggressively to exploit their short-lived private information 
favouring market orders in order to guarantee an immediate execution. Furthermore, since the 
direction of prices is conditional on the private information, the execution likelihood of limit 
orders designed to exploit a trader’s advantage is almost null. For instance, an informed investor 
who knows that the actual price at which the security is traded is too low will expect the price 
to increase in the near future, especially when the same information benefit is disposable to 
other investors. Therefore, the probability that a limit buy order will match is relatively low in 
this scenario. 
Other theoretical papers allow informed traders to decide between market and limit orders. The 
majority of these studies contradicts the prediction of the previous literature, stating that 
informed investors post also limit orders in a rational expectation world. For example, 
Chakravarty and Holden (1995) demonstrated in their work that an optimal order placement 
strategy involved the submission of both types of orders. Parlour (1998) showed a dynamic 
model where the combined effects of the current liquidity situation and of the place in the order 
book queue impact on the decision between a limit order or a market order. Foucalt (1999) 
studied a market with heterogenous asset valuation among agents with no private information. 
His dynamic order placement model showed the existence of a trade-off between strategies that 
involve limit orders and strategies that involve market orders, depending on the volatility of 
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asset returns and bid-ask spreads. In addition, Handa and Schwartz (1996, 2003) examined the 
role of asymmetric knowledge on the order placement strategies. Their findings stated that a 
limit order strategy can be profitable whenever the expected gain from limit order matching is 
higher than the cost of being picked-off by an informed participant. 
In addition, Biais, Hillion, and Spatt (1995) showed that price revisions tend to move in the 
direction of previous limit order flows. Anand and Martell (2001) empirically demonstrated 
that, after controlling the characteristics of the orders, the price trend after the matching was 
beneficial to limit order traders. Moreover, they showed that limit orders submitted by 
individual investors (uniformed/liquidity traders) performed poorer than limit orders submitted 
by institutional (informed) traders. Therefore they suggested that, once institutional agents have 
learnt an extremely beneficial private information, they maximize their trading profits and 
reduce the risk of uncertain trading prices using limit orders. Contrary, Griffiths et al. (2000) 
showed that in the Toronto Stock Exchange limit orders are subject to be picked off by better 
informed traders, suggesting that they tend to impact negatively on prices and hence they may 
not contain much relevant information. 
More recently, Ranaldo (2004) studied how an investor’s strategy is conditional on the state of 
the limit order book. He suggests that patient traders submit more market orders and hence they 
are more aggressive when their side of the book is thicker, the spread is wider and the volatility 
increases. Kaniel and Liu (2006) built a simple equilibrium model where private information is 
considered long-lived and available to a small number of agents. They showed that informed 
traders may prefer limit orders, and hence the book contains useful information. In this case, 
posting market orders signals impatience and reveals too much information. Therefore market 
orders may cause higher transaction costs, although their execution is certain and immediate. 
 
The Information Content of the Limit Order Book 
Regardless of the channel through which information gets embedded in the limit order book, 
the common result of the above mentioned works is that market depth should convey relevant 
information for the true value of the underlying asset traded and, thus, it should be indicative 
of future price movements. This information content and in particular how to exploit it is the 
main objective of third branch of the literature on the order book trading. Even in the absence 
of asymmetric information, the shape of the limit order book (i.e. the number of shares on each 
price level and how far away price steps are from each other) gives market participants an 
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instantaneous picture of the market supply and demand. More in detail, the asymmetries 
between the buy and sell side of the book signal shifts in the demand and supply curves caused 
by unobservable exogenous factors which impact on the stock prices. Studying and analysing 
the market depth, agents have more chance of guessing what these determinants are and of 
forecasting the evolution of future price. 
Among first to investigate further this concept, Harris (1990) studied two types of limit order 
traders: value-oriented and pre-committed agents. The former assign their asset valuation 
through their choice of limit price, while the latter use limit orders to reduce transaction costs, 
but will opt for market orders if their instructions stay unfilled for too long. Both actions may 
be helpful in predicting future movements of the stock price. A book imbalance caused by 
value-oriented agents will signal how they value the underlying asset and then this value will 
be incorporated in prices. In the other cases, an informative imbalance may also depend on the 
fact that pre-committed traders switch their unfilled orders into market orders. For instance, a 
thicker sell than buy side would reveal a future price decrease. The same author (Harris, 1990) 
stated that price evolution and asymmetries in the shape of the two sides of the limit order book 
may be joint by the behaviour of quote-matchers. The “quotematching” strategy consists in 
extracting options values from the standing active orders by trading ahead of the heavier side 
of the book. 
More recent literature has studied the empirical determinants of the order aggressiveness. In an 
experimental paper, Bloomfield, O’Hara and Saar (2005) showed that informed traders exploit 
their information advantage early in the trading period to look for mispriced standing orders 
moving the market toward the right price, and therefore progressively reduce their knowledge 
value. As the closing of the trading period comes closer, they switch increasingly to limit orders, 
as the value of their informational advantage falls away. Analysing SuperDot limit orders in the 
TORQ database of the NYSE, Harris and Panchapagesan (2005) reaffirmed that specialists 
exploit the ability of the order book shape to indicate short term changes in prices. Evans and 
Lyon (2006) found that the predicting power of clients’ order flow is able to outperform a 
random walk benchmark: result that has been contested by two studies, Danielsson et al. (2002) 
and, Sager and Taylor (2008), which documented limited and no evidence of superior 
forecasting ability of order imbalance strategies over random walk models at different forecast 
horizons. However, Latza and Payne (2010) showed that both limit and market orders can be 
indicative on stock returns. They also documented how this power was greater for limit orders 
flows, in particular in presence of a liquid market. 
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Based on the open book from the Australian Stock Exchange, Cao, Hansch and Wang (2009) 
documented the incremental information content of the price levels behind the best bid and 
offer. According to their work, the contribution of the LOB to price discovery accounts 
approximately for the 22%, while most of the variation in future returns comes from the best 
bid, ask and transaction prices. They then found that order imbalances between demand and 
supply schedules along the book are statistically significant to predict future short-term returns. 
Hautsch and Huang (2011) estimated the impulse response functions for the thirty stocks listed 
at Euronext Amsterdam: the limit orders, especially for orders posted on up to two steps behind 
the market price, have a significant effect on quote adjustments. Lin et al. (2012) studied the 
TAIEX futures, a benchmark of the Taiwan equity market and a market capitalization weighted 
index composed of all the ordinary stocks listed. Using the best five quotes of the limit order 
book, they proposed a trading strategy, which was able to earn positive returns even when 
transaction costs were taken into account. 
Overall, the above-studies support the hypothesis that the order book contains useful 
information, in particular in the price levels immediate behind the best quotes. However they 
all are focused on equity or forex markets, where normally there is not any liquidity issue. 
Moreover, almost all of them analysed spot markets. 
In the following chapters we present and examine the information content of an open order 
book, using data about Germany Baseload 2018, a power futures contract traded in the 
European Energy Exchange. One of the main characteristics of this futures market is that many 
market participants operate for the purpose of hedging and risk management. This issue, plus 
the peculiarity of the contract considered, makes our dataset very low liquid and volatile. 
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4.2 ORDER BOOK IMBALANCE MEASURES 
The relationship between trade activity (volume) and price change and volatility has been one 
of the prominent field of study in the finance literature. At any point in time, a limit order book 
is populated by a large number of buy and sell orders. As traders submit limit orders to buy or 
sell, they impact on the bid or ask volume of the book and hence they give other participants a 
perspective of their trading intentions. Classifying trade volume as either taking the bid or ask 
would permit us to obtain a better understanding of the upcoming price changes. The Order 
Imbalance measure is used to identify this price direction and in its simplest form can be defined 
as the difference between the bid and ask volume. The Order Imbalance is a relevant indicator 
that allows us to gain a deeper insight into the general sentiment and into the next probable 
move of the market. Whenever informed agents obtain news that have not been incorporated 
into the asset price yet, they can take a long or short position depending on the grade of 
information positivity and consequently affecting the imbalance on the asset. Who, instead, is 
merely looking at this descriptor in the LOB would exploit it and enhance his or her strategy to 
generate positive returns. 
 
Volume Order Imbalance Ratio 
Many different imbalance measures have been proposed over years. The most common 
representation is given by the Volume Order Imbalance Ratio (VOI), that is the difference 
between buy side and ask side volumes normalized for the total volume available at a specified 
lowest depth having non-zero volume 
𝑉𝑂𝐼(𝑡) =
𝑉௕(𝑡) − 𝑉௔(𝑡)
𝑉௕(𝑡) + 𝑉௔(𝑡)
 
where 𝑉𝑂𝐼(𝑡)  ∈ (−1; +1), and both 𝑉௔ and 𝑉௕ are computed as the weighted average volumes 
at the 𝑛-th best price levels. More positive (negative) values indicate an imbalance in favour of 
the bid (ask) side. 
 
Trade Imbalance 
The Trade Imbalance (TI), instead, is measured as the imbalance between the executed buy and 
sell volumes in a certain time interval (∆𝑡). Buy volume and sell volume are classified when 
marketable buy/sell orders are matched to active limit orders sitting on the other side of the 
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book. Hence, Trade Imbalance summarizes the net transaction volume in the considered time 
interval. 
𝑇𝐼∆௧ = ෍(𝑏∆௧ − 𝑠∆௧) 
where 𝑏∆௧  and 𝑠∆௧ are buyer- and seller-initiated trades. 
 
Order Flow Imbalance 
Focusing on the Level I order book, Cont et al. (2011) introduced the Order Flow Imbalance, 
defined as the imbalance between supply and demand at the best level, which encompasses 
trades, limit orders and cancelations. Each observation of the bid and ask consists of the bid 
price 𝑃஻ and the size 𝑞஻ of the bid queue (in number of shares), the ask price 𝑃஺ and the size 
𝑞஺. Enumerating them by 𝑛 and comparing two subsequent observations, one of the following 
events can occur: 
 𝑃௡஻ > 𝑃௡ିଵ஻  or 𝑞௡஻ > 𝑞௡ିଵ஻  signifying an increase in demand; 
 𝑃௡஻ < 𝑃௡ିଵ஻  or 𝑞௡஻ < 𝑞௡ିଵ஻  signifying a decrease in demand; 
 𝑃௡஺ < 𝑃௡ିଵ஺  or 𝑞௡஺ > 𝑞௡ିଵ஺  signifying an increase in supply; 
 𝑃௡஺ > 𝑃௡ିଵ஺  or 𝑞௡஺ < 𝑞௡ିଵ஺  signifying a decrease in supply. 
 
Hence, they have defined the variable 𝑒௡ which measures the contribution of the 𝑛-th event to 
the size of the bid and ask queues: 
𝑒௡ = 𝐼൛௉೙ಳஹ௉೙షభಳ ൟ𝑞௡
஻ − 𝐼൛௉೙ಳஸ௉೙షభಳ ൟ𝑞௡ିଵ
஻ − 𝐼൛௉೙ಲஸ௉೙షభಲ ൟ𝑞௡
஺ + 𝐼൛௉೙ಲஹ௉೙షభಲ ൟ𝑞௡ିଵ
஺  
If 𝑃஻ does not vary, the variable gets the value 𝑒௡ = 𝑞௡஻ − 𝑞௡ିଵ஻ , regardless of an increase or a 
decrease in 𝑞஻. If 𝑞஻ increases, 𝑒௡ indicates the size that was added at the bid. If instead 𝑞஻ 
decreases, the variable measures the size that was removed from the bid, whether due to a 
market sell or a cancel buy order. When 𝑃஻ increases, 𝑒௡ = 𝑞௡஻ represents the size of a price-
improving limit order. If 𝑃஻ decreases, 𝑒௡ = 𝑞௡ିଵ஻  indicates the size that was removed, whether 
due to a market order or a cancellation. With signs reversed, the same classification holds for 
the ask side. 
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The Order Flow Imbalance (OFI) is then defined as the sum of individual event contributions 
𝑒௡ over a specified time interval 
𝑂𝐹𝐼 = ෍ 𝑒௡ 
 
Limit Order Book Imbalance 
Another proxy of the order book shape, the Limit Order Book Imbalance (LOI) can be simply 
obtained by taking the difference between the volume weighted price on the top 𝑛 price levels 
and the mid-quote. 
𝐿𝑂𝐼 =
∑(𝑃௞஻𝑞௞஻ + 𝑃௞஺𝑞௞஺)
∑(𝑞௞஻ + 𝑞௞஺)
− 𝑀𝐼𝐷 
where 𝑀𝐼𝐷 = ௕௘௦௧஺௦௞ା௕௘௦௧஻
ଶ
 and 𝑘 indicates the price level. 
 
Step-wise scaled imbalance in the length and in the height 
In accordance with Cao and al. (2009), the aggregate market demand and supply are represented 
by limit orders as step functions of the accumulated number of shares offered at each price 
level. They then calculated the height and the length of each step for the demand and the ask 
side of the book respectively. 
 The 𝐻𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡 of a particular price level 𝑘 on the demand side is defined as follows 𝐻௞஻ =
𝑃௞஻ − 𝑃௞ିଵ஻ . The height at the first step is obtained by taking the difference between the 
price at the best first level and the mid-quote; 
 
 the 𝐿𝑒𝑛𝑔𝑡ℎ at a step 𝑘 on the demand side of the book, 𝑄௞஻, is the aggregate number of 
shares across all orders at price 𝑃௞஻; 
 
 the heights and lengths of steps on the supply side are defined analogously. 
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In order to capture the aggressiveness of the orders submission, these last two indicators are 
then used to calculate the step-wise scaled imbalance in the length (QR) and in the height  (HR) 
using the following formulae: 
𝑄𝑅௞ =
𝑄௞஺ − 𝑄௞஺
𝑄௞஺ + 𝑄௞஺
 
𝐻𝑅௞ =
(𝑃௞஺ − 𝑃௞ିଵ஺ ) − |𝑃௞௕ − 𝑃௞ିଵ௕ |
(𝑃௞஺ − 𝑃௞ିଵ஺ ) − |𝑃௞௕ − 𝑃௞ିଵ௕ |
 
where the 𝐻𝑅 indicates the revealed differences in price between two subsequent quotes. When 
there exists a greater competition among the buyers, they are likely to submit more aggressive 
orders. Hence the price difference should be smaller. If it is the situation, the 𝐻𝑅 parameter has 
a positive value forecasting a higher likelihood of an upward move in the short-term future 
prices. The contrary, that is negative value of 𝐻𝑅, predicts a greater chance of a decline in 
prices. 𝑄𝑅 is measured from the perspective of market demand and supply. A positive value 
means that the buying side has lower depth, that is less investors want to buy the underlying 
contracts. In these instances, more shares are submitted to the ask side, this drives the price 
down due an excess in the supply. In the opposite scenario the price will move upward. 
 
Order Book Slope 
We conclude our brief list of order book shape indicators introducing the Order Book Slope 
(SLOPE) measure. Following Naes and Skjeltorp (2006), for the asset 𝑖 in the interval 𝑡 the 
predictor is defined as follows: 
𝑆𝐿𝑂𝑃𝐸௜,௧ =
𝐷𝐸௜,௧ + 𝑆𝐸௜,௧
2
 
where 𝐷𝐸௜,௧ is the slope of the demand (bid) side and 𝑆𝐸௜,௧ stays for the slope of the supply 
(ask) side. The order book slope for the demand side for asset 𝑖 in the interval 𝑡 is given by: 
𝐷𝐸௜,௧ =
1
𝑁஻
⎩
⎪
⎨
⎪
⎧
𝑣ଵ஻
| 𝑝ଵ
஻
𝑝଴
− 1|
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𝑣௞஻
− 1
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஻
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Similarly, the order book slope for the supply side can be calculated as: 
𝑆𝐸௜,௧ =
1
𝑁஺
⎩
⎪
⎨
⎪
⎧
𝑣ଵ஺
𝑝ଵ஺
𝑝଴
− 1
+ ෍
𝑣௞ାଵ஺
𝑣௞஺
− 1
𝑝௞ାଵ஺
𝑝௞஺
− 1
ேಲିଵ
ఛୀଵ
⎭
⎪
⎬
⎪
⎫
 
where 𝑁஺ and 𝑁஻ are total number of offer and buy price levels with non-zero size, respectively. 
𝑘 indicates the price level, with 𝑘 = 0 denoting the best bid-ask midpoint and 𝑘 = 1 denoting 
the best bid/ask quote with positive share volume. 𝑝௢ represents the best bid-ask midpoint, while 
𝑣௞஺ and 𝑣௞஻ are the natural logarithm of the aggregated total volume at the price level 𝑘 (𝑝௞). In 
other words, 𝑣௞஺ (𝑣௞஻) is the natural logarithm of total the share volume supplied (demanded) at 
the quote level 𝑝௞. Essentially, the Order Book Slope is an average elasticity measure 
𝛿𝑞
𝛿𝑝ൗ  
that describes how the supplied quantity 𝑞 changes with respect to the price 𝑝 across all price 
levels with non-zero size in the limit order book. The more concentrated (widely distributed) 
the shares size in the LOB are, the steeper (more gentle) the slope will be. Empirical findings 
(Duong and Kalev, 2008) demonstrated the negative significant relation between the slope 
variable and the future volatility, that is the volatility decreases the more steeper the slope is. 
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5. INTRODUCTION TO ELECTRICITY MARKETS 
 
5.1 ELECTRICITY AS A COMMODITY 
A commodity is a tradable economic asset that has an intrinsic value. It has to be sufficiently 
standardized in relation to some fundamental characteristics in order to be completely fungible. 
In other words, the quality of a given commodity may differ slightly, but it is essential uniform 
across different producers. Hence, commodities are undifferentiated goods with equivalent 
quality standards that are exchanged without any additional added value. If traded on a trading 
venue, they must also meet specified minimum standards, known as a basis grade. 
Electricity is an energy commodity with unique economic and technical characteristics. It is 
used for a very wide range of applications because it is easy to control, non-polluting at the 
location of its usage and convenient. As a secondary energy source, it is generated from the 
conversion of natural gas, coal, hydropower, nuclear power and other renewable sources.  This 
implies that electricity markets and prices are fundamentally linked to markets for primary fuels 
and environmental conditions. Hence, it is essential to consider both the power generation 
processes and the primary fuel markets in order to understand the mechanism that drives 
electricity markets. 
From the perspective of the consumption side, the energy demand shows a high variability, both 
on the short and medium-long term. During daytime there is an alternation between peak hours 
(from 8 a.m. to 8 p.m.), when there is the maximum need, and off-peak hours, when the power 
need is relatively low. Considering instead a long-term perspective, the energy demand of each 
country shows different seasonality patterns related to the social and climate characteristics of 
that region. A second relevant property is the demand rigidity, that is the low elasticity with 
respect to a price change due to the fact that electricity is an essential and hardly replaceable 
good. Moreover, it is considered a homogeneous product because electricity does not have 
qualities that can change the consumer’s liking. In contrast, from the perspective of the supply 
side, the technologies and production costs are heterogeneous and they depend significantly on 
the type of fuel used. A mix of diversified power generation techniques allows to change the 
utilization factor of each industrial plant in order to meet the demand at the lowest possible cost. 
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From the technical point of view, the storage impossibility implies that the energy commodity 
cannot be purchased in periods of excess production to be resold in those of shortage. This 
causes a huge impact on the market infrastructure and organization because the electric power 
is useful if and only if it can be delivered in one period of time. Indeed, on energy markets, 
market participants exchange contracts which provide the delivery of the underlying in a pre-
specified time interval. The unit of measurement is the Megawatt-Hour (MWh): the energy 
produced by supplying the power of 1 MW for 1 hour. A related characteristic resulting from 
the non-storability is the high volatility of spot2 prices in case of a tight or excessive supply 
situation. In a forward/futures3 market the price movements are much smaller because the 
availability of power plants and the weather-dependent demand are still unknown. 
Moreover, the lack of storability requires an exact matching of supply and demand at all times. 
The energy must be supply whenever it is requested, and consequently complex dispatching 
operations are needed in order to ensure the continuous balance between demand and supply. 
The necessity of a dispatching network in turn prevents a global market. The task to balance 
the system is performed by the Transmission System Operator (TSO), who charges the 
merchant directly or the retail clients via a transmission fee for its service. The TSO specifies a 
balancing period, that is the granularity of the measured electric energy supply. The 
continuously volatile needs of the retail customers are integrated over the balancing period and 
the average power is the forecasted size that should be delivered by the supplying merchant. 
                                                          
2 A spot contract is a financial agreement between two counterparties, the seller V and the 
buyer A, that establishes the quantity of the commodity traded and the amount to be paid in 
exchange. V has the obligation to physically deliver to A a certain amount 𝑥 of the 
commodity on the stipulation date 𝑡, meanwhile A must pay V a fixed sum 𝑆(𝑡), known as 
spot price of the commodity in 𝑡. 
 
3 A futures contract is a standardised financial agreement between two counterparties, the 
seller V and the buyer A, that establishes the price and the quantity of the commodity traded 
that the former must deliver to the latter on the 𝑇 date, called expiration date, later than the 
stipulation date 𝑡.  V has the obligation to deliver to A a certain amount 𝑥 of the commodity 
in 𝑇, meanwhile A must pay V a fixed amount 𝐹(𝑡, 𝑇), the futures price. 𝐹(𝑡, 𝑇) is the 
commodity price in 𝑡 with delivery in 𝑇; the time interval (𝑡, 𝑇) is defined as Time-To-
Maturity. 
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Consequently, the merchant delivers electricity as a discrete time series with time intervals 
according to the balancing period and constant power during this time periods. 
 
All the principal products traded in the electricity markets are delivery schedules in a granularity 
not finer than the balancing period. Figure 8 illustrates the different categories of an electricity 
market and the corresponding time flow. 
 
 
Figure 8. Categories of the electricity market 
 
In general, the electricity markets can be divided into: 
 
 Forward and Futures markets are used both for risk management, hedging and 
speculative purposes. It is also the relevant venue for traders who actively take positions 
and thereby provide liquidity for hedgers. 
 
 Day-ahead market, where products are exchanged with a delivery on the next trading 
day. Day-ahead products are common spot contracts and can be traded on a power 
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exchange or as bilateral agreement (Over-The-Counter4). Normally the spot market is 
taken as underlying for the reference price for the forward and futures market. 
 
 Intra-day market whose products are exchanged with a delivery on the same day. This 
type of market allows the power producers a short-term load dependent optimisation of 
their generated quantity and typically it is not used for pure trading purposes. As for 
day-ahead contracts, intra-day products are traded OTC or on a power regulated 
exchange. 
 
 Reserve and Balancing market. The first allows the transmission system operator to 
purchase at short notice the quantity needed for compensating temporary imbalances 
between the demand and supply in the electricity system. In a balancing market a 
merchant sells or buys the additional energy needed for taking in equilibrium his 
accounting grid. The balancing market can be considered a market only in a broad sense 
due to the fact that the balancing operations are provided by the TSO and it gets a fee 
or pays the merchant for the additional energy. Only in some countries the merchant has 
the choice to buy or sell this additional amount of energy from or to someone else. 
  
                                                          
4 Over-The-Counter (OTC) operations involve transactions of securities that are not listed in a 
regulated, formal exchange. They represent non-standardized contracts that are traded through 
a private dealer network which negotiates directly with buyers and sellers. 
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5.2 FUTURE POWER CONTRACTS 
Since our analysis is based on a futures energy contract, we analyse deeper its characteristics. 
Energy contracts differ from futures agreements on other more generic commodities because 
they are settled into a delivery period, instead of an expiration date, during which the long 
counterparty receives the specified quantity and pays the price established on the stipulation. 
Normally, delivery periods may have a weekly, monthly, quarterly or yearly duration and each 
contract defines the provision of a constant electrical power of 1 MW over the entire delivery 
period. Moreover, energy futures are divided into base-load and peak-load, depending on the 
daytime interval in which the power delivery is guaranteed. The definition of peak hours 
depends on the trading venue, but often the interval is (8 a.m. – 8 p.m.) from Monday to Friday. 
Considering a monthly base-load futures, the underlying is defined as follows: 
1 MW * 24 h/day * 31 days = 744 MWh 
More generally, a base-load contract over a n-days delivery period will oblige to provide 
electricity equal to 24n MWh, constantly delivering the power of 1 MW. Generally, the 
minimum price fluctuation is equal to 0,01 €/MWh.  
As in the most common exchanges, the energy futures can be distinguished into those physically 
delivered and those settled in cash based on a reference price. The determination of the final 
settlement price is based on an index which is the mean value of all auction prices of the hourly 
Day-Ahead contracts traded for the respective market area and delivery time (Base/Peak) of the 
respective delivery period. Since financial energy futures do not require the effective electricity 
production and consumption, they are useful both for hedging purposes and for arbitrage or 
speculative reasons. 
In addition, all futures on energy markets are characterised by two fundamental properties: 
 the Samuelson effect (Samuelson, 1965) states that the futures volatility is decreasing 
with respect to the time to delivery, hence it is lower the longer is the Time-To-Maturity 
(TTM). Moreover, the decay is exponential and the volatility tends to a constant strictly 
positive value when the expiration period converges to infinity. Samuelson suggests that 
the most relevant information on the underlying asset becomes common knowledge 
only in the proximity of the futures maturity; therefore, it does not impact on contracts 
with distant delivery. For instance, climate changes that affect the natural gas demand 
or temporary problems in the electricity transmission network will cause adjustments 
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only in spot prices and shorter futures. Conversely, those contracts with a bigger TTM 
will show a long-term volatility which is the result of other macro-factors, such as 
technology innovations or geopolitical issues that can influence the commodity value. 
 
 Seasonality: the climate and behavioural characteristics of the specific region, where 
the commodity is needed, are among the main drivers of its price. Those factors show 
time cycles both on the short and medium term. For example, the natural gas demanded 
by residential users depends strongly on the season temperature. Since these cycles are 
mirrored into the information flow that determines the reference prices, the volatility is 
expected to manifest them too. 
 
As for more generic commodities, the margins system is used in order to guarantee the 
transaction success. On the stipulation date the counterparties deposit to the Clearing House the 
initial margin and, later, at the end of each trading day the party, who has accrued a loss, pays 
the variation margin to restore the previous equilibrium. In the case of contracts with delivery 
time longer than one month, the cascading mechanism is required. In the case of a quarter future, 
the cascading process implies that on the third business day before the beginning of the delivery 
period, each open position in a Quarter Future is replaced by equivalent positions in the three 
Month Futures whose delivery months together correspond to the delivery quarter. An example 
would explain clearly how it works. At the end of the last trading day, a long position in a 
quarter future Q1-2018 will be replaced by three long positions in the futures Jan-2018, Feb-
2018 and Mar-2018. Considering instead a yearly future, each open position will be converted 
into equivalent positions in the three Month Futures for the delivery months from January 
through to March and the three Quarter Futures for the second through to the fourth delivery 
quarter whose delivery periods together correspond to the delivery year. 
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5.3 THE EUROPEAN ENERGY EXCHANGE 
The European Energy Exchange (EEX) is the leading energy trading venue in central and 
western Europe. It develops, operates and connects secure, liquid and transparent markets for 
energy and related products on which power, natural gas, CO2 emission allowances and coal 
are traded. It involves both spot and futures transactions and beside them, also Over-The-
Counter operations are allowed to be registered via its fully electronic platform. It was born in 
Leipzig in 2002 as the result of the merger between two previously existing exchanges: the 
Leipzig Power Exchange and the European Energy Exchange located in Frankfurt. Since then, 
it has grown into a global market group through a series of partnership and acquisitions 
throughout Europe, Asia and US. Besides its flagship market in Germany, the group consists 
of the following companies: 
 the European Power Exchange (EPEX SPOT), that operates physical short-term 
electricity markets in Central Western Europe and the United Kingdom; 
 the Powernext, a market facilitator based in Paris that develops tailor-made solutions 
and operates the Pan-European Gas Platform PEGAS; 
 the Prague-based Power Exchange Central Europe (PXE), that is committed to further 
developing products and services for the Czech, Slovak, Polish, Hungarian and 
Romanian market; 
 the Danish gas exchange Gaspoint Nordic that offers short-maturity products for 
physical trade of natural gas; 
 the regulated futures venue Cleartrade Exchange (CLTX), based in Singapore. It 
specializes in Freight, Ferrous Metals, Agricultural and Energy markets in Asia; 
 the Virginia-based Nodal Exchange, that provides price, credit and liquidity risk 
management solutions to participants in the North American energy markets; 
 two clearing companies, the European Commodity Clearing (ECC) and Nodal Clear. 
 
Currently, the group holding company is a subsidiary of Eurex, the largest European derivatives 
and options market, which in turn is under the Deutsche Börse umbrella of companies. Overall 
the entire group has extended its commodities variety, offering also contracts on oil, freight, 
metals, environmental and agricultural products. In 2017 it has served more than 500 trading 
participants from more than 30 countries. 
Spot transactions are conducted both in the trading type of continuous trading and auctions, 
while futures derivatives contracts are traded only via the former one. The opening price is 
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determined during the opening auction on the basis of both limit and market orders contained 
in the trading system and it shall be the price at which the largest possible number of contracts 
of such orders and quotes may be executed (principle of maximizing executions). During 
continuous trading instead, the exchange prices are determined by matching orders at the best 
possible bid and ask limits indicated in the order book. In the event that prices are identical, 
orders and quotes are matched in the order in which they were entered into the EEX system 
(price-time priority); unlimited orders are executed first. All available orders shall be displayed 
cumulatively at the respective limits (open order book). 
Focusing on spot markets, an open auction is generally divided into the call phase and the price 
determination. During the call phase, exchange participants may enter, change or delete orders. 
If there are orders that could be executed against one another, in auctions with a closed order 
book, a potential execution price is displayed during the call phase. If this is not the case, the 
best buy and/or sell limit is displayed. In auctions with an open order book, the cumulated order 
volumes of each of the buy and/or sell limits are also displayed. Neither a potential execution 
price nor order volumes are displayed in a closed auction. 
All the contracts offered by the European Energy Exchange are traded throughout the T7 trading 
infrastructure. This is a proprietary technology of the Deutsche Börse and indeed it is also being 
used by Xetra (the reference market for German equities and ETFs) and the Eurex Exchange 
(the largest European futures and options market); in addition to the american International 
Securities Exchange (ISE) and the Bombay Stock Exchange (BSE). 
The EEX products can also be exchanged throughout the Trayport trading platform, specifically 
designed to meet the particular needs of the energy market for physical and financial trading. 
The London-based company does not own or operate markets, it is instead an experienced OTC 
and Exchange software provider. Initially used by energy inter-dealer brokers as a price 
dissemination platform, their product range has evolved significantly and nowadays it offers 
also trading and clearing solutions in a multiple markets configuration. 
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6. TESTING THE LIMIT ORDER BOOK INFORMATIVENESS 
 
6.1 DATA 
The data used in this study are extracted from the Trayport Trading System. The dataset 
considers the period from 3rd October 2016 to 28th February 2017 and it accounts for all OTC 
and EEX transactions that occurred on the contract Phelix DE Baseload 2018. The futures 
specifications are designed by the European Energy Exchange and it defines the provision of 
electricity over the full year 2018 (365 days) for each hour of the day, constantly delivered at 
the power of 1 MW, for the market area Germany. It is traded throughout continuous trading 
mechanism from 8 a.m. to 6 p.m. CET without any opening or closing auction. The minimum 
tick size is equal to 0,01 €/MWh. As very simple classification, we can consider that OTC 
transactions involve the physical delivery, whereas EEX transactions are settled in cash. The 
underlying reference price for the final settlement is based on the hourly Day-Ahead auction 
prices determined by the EPEX spot for the corresponding market area. 
The open limit order book makes no distinction between OTC and EEX transactions and it 
gives information until the best twentieth quotes. For each order, we have at our disposal the 
order type (market or buy), the order arrival date and time, the order direction (buy or sell), the 
order price and quantity. In the trades file instead, we collect information on the transaction 
date and time, and the transaction price. Any other information about the quantity traded or 
transaction directions, that is whether the transaction was buyer-/ or seller-initiated, was not 
available. 
To avoid confounding effects due to the opening or the closing of the trading session, the 
authors restrict their attention to the period from 9 a.m. to 5 p.m.. Moreover, only the top five 
levels are considered in the empirical model; this is due to the fact that most of the time the fifth 
quote represents the deepest level with non-zero volume. 
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6.2 METHODOLOGY 
As discussed in previous chapters, there has been empirical evidence in favour of the 
information content of the limit order book in equity and stock markets. More precisely the 
public information of an order book, determined by the number of shares on each price level 
and by how far away price levels are from each other, gives investors a better chance to guessing 
the unobservable exogenous factors that have an impact on returns. What we would like to test 
now is whether these findings are valid also for a completely different scenario like that 
provided by an energy market. Using some of the indicators introduced previously, we want to 
examine the predictive power of imbalance along the limit-order book on the future short-term 
returns. 
From now on, we will explicitly refer to the model proposed by Cao, Hansch and Wang (2009) 
to verify the following hypothesis: 
Limit orders behind the best bid and ask prices contain information about short-term future 
price movements. 
A rejection of the hypothesis would imply that the make-up and shape of the limit order book 
are not related to, and hence do not convey any additional information about, short-term price 
movements beyond those contained in the inside spread and depth. 
The methodology involves the examination of the relation between the returns of futures 
contracts and lagged order-book statistics that are constructed from the demand and supply 
schedules. In order to avoid any issues about missing data and/or transactions mispriced by 
investors, the returns have been obtained using the buying and selling price midpoints for the 
best quote instead of the futures transaction prices. The formula for the return is as follows: 
𝑀𝐼𝐷௧ =
𝑏𝑒𝑠𝑡𝐴𝑠𝑘 + 𝑏𝑒𝑠𝑡𝐵𝑖𝑑
2
 
𝑟௧ = ln (
𝑀𝐼𝐷௧
𝑀𝐼𝐷௧ିଵ
) 
Since our dataset showed a very low number of average transactions per day, this study 
experimented snapshots of the order book at different time intervals. We investigated samples 
taken every one-minute, five-minute, ten-minute and fifteen-minute. The five-minute interval 
has been proved to be the best balance between the need to have a sufficient large number of 
observation points and the need to let the futures price to experience a meaningful change 
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between two subsequent observations.  As short-term returns may exhibit autocorrelation, the 
authors run the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) test to find the autoregressive model that 
fits best with our dataset. Based on the smallest AIC value, we used the AR(5) model to obtain 
innovation in returns as follows: 
𝑟௧ = 𝛼଴ + ෍ 𝛼௜𝑟௧ିଵ + 𝜀௧∗ 
where 𝑟௧ is the five-minute midprice return at 𝑡 and 𝜀௧∗ is the return innovation. 
Since the residual 𝜀௧∗ captures the unpredictable component of the returns, it has been then used 
as the dependent variable in the regression analysis. As independent variables, the authors took 
the relative inside spread, which is defined using the following formula: 
𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑 =
𝑏𝑒𝑠𝑡𝐴𝑠𝑘 − 𝑏𝑒𝑠𝑡𝐵𝑖𝑑
𝑏𝑒𝑠𝑡𝐴𝑠𝑘 + 𝑏𝑒𝑠𝑡𝐵𝑖𝑑
 
and the step-wise scaled imbalance indicators in the length, 𝑄𝑅௞, and in the height, 𝐻𝑅௞, that 
we have defined previously in subsection 4.2. The relative spread variable and the scale 
imbalance in the quantity at level 1, 𝑄𝑅ଵ, have been included to control for the information 
contained at the top of the order book that traders normally had access to at all times. 
Hence, the regression model is defined as follows: 
𝜀௧∗ = 𝛼଴ + 𝛽଴𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑௧ିଵ + 𝛾௧𝑄𝑅ଵ,௧ିଵ + ∑ 𝛽௞𝐻𝑅௞,௧ିଵ + ∑ 𝛾௞𝑄𝑅௞,௧ିଵ +௞ 𝜂௧௞    (1) 
 
During the empirical analysis, variables from different quotes, 𝑘, are progressively included 
into the model. Each regression studies the book information up to step 𝑛 where 𝑛 = 1,2,3,4,5. 
It has not been possible to include a deeper price level because most of the time the fifth quote 
represents the maximum depth quote that our futures contract had. As the main objective is to 
investigate the predictive power of the limit order book imbalances, a primary focus goes to the 
change in the adjusted R-squared as more steps are included in the regression. It, indeed, 
represents the proportion of the variance in the dependent variable that is predictable from the 
independent variables, while controlling for the number of predictors. The adjusted R-squared 
increases only if the new term improves the model more than would be expected by chance. 
Conversely, it decreases when a predictor improves the model by less than expected by chance. 
The results report also the F-statistic for the null hypothesis that all coefficients are jointly zero. 
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Intuitively, return is predicted to be positively related to 𝐻𝑅௞,௧ିଵ because smaller price 
increments on the demand side would imply a higher aggressiveness in buying rather than 
selling shares. Conversely, return is supposed to decrease with 𝑄𝑅௞,௧ିଵ as more volume on the 
offering side should have a negative impact on prices due to the excess supply. 
The relation between future order submissions and the status of the order book has been 
documented by several studies conducted on order placement strategies (for instance Griffiths, 
Smith, Turnbull, & White, 2000; Hollifield, Miller, & Sanda, 2004). Their findings documented 
that more market sell (buy) orders are due to a large depth at the sell (buy) side of the book. 
These marketable orders consume the active limit orders on the other side of the LOB and they 
cause a decrease (increase) in futures prices. Hence, it is the feedback effect between the order 
placement strategies and the book that links future price movement and the current book status. 
Equation (1) has then rewritten considering the supply and demand side of the book separately; 
that is the length and the height of steps on the supply and demand side are taken as independent 
variables. The new empirical model is 
𝜀௧∗ = 𝛼଴ + 𝛽଴𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑௧ିଵ + ∑ 𝛾ௗ,௞𝑄௞,௧ିଵௗ +௞ ∑ 𝛾௦,௞𝑄௞,௧ିଵ௦ + ∑ 𝛽ௗ,௞𝐻௞,௧ିଵௗ +௞௞
+ ∑ 𝛽௦,௞𝐻௞,௧ିଵ௦ +௞ 𝜂௧           (2) 
In addition to the abovementioned analysis, this study measures the scope of imbalance using 
the price impact indicators as independent variables. Indeed, the chances for informed trading 
are maximum when significant imbalances exist between the demand and supply. Conversely, 
the opportunities are minimal in the opposite scenario. The price impact indicator is obtained 
ex ante as a cost of trading for a hypothetical trade size of 𝑞 shares. Since the average trade size 
was not available in our dataset, the authors set 𝑞 as multiples of the average bid/ask volume at 
the top level. For the demand side, the price impact measure 𝐿𝐷(𝑞) is calculated as the discount 
per share that a market-seller gets below the midpoint of the best bid and ask: 
𝐿𝐷(𝑞) =
𝑃ଵ௦ + 𝑃ଵௗ
2
−
∑ 𝑃௝ௗ𝑄௝ௗ + 𝑃௠భ
ௗ 𝑄௠భ
௟ௗ௠భିଵ
௝ୀଵ
𝑞
 
and 𝑞 = ∑ 𝑄௜ௗ + 𝑄௠భ
௟ௗ௠భିଵ
௜ୀଵ  
where the step 𝑚ଵ is defined according to ∑ 𝑄௜ௗ
௠భିଵ
௜ୀଵ < 𝑞 ≤ ∑ 𝑄௜
ௗ௠భ
௜ୀଵ  and 𝑄
௟ௗ is the number of 
shares on step 𝑚ଵ to fulfil the order 𝑞 shares after the first 𝑚ଵ − 1 steps are filled. 
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In a similar way, the price impact 𝐿𝑆(𝑞)  on the supply side is calculated as the premium per 
share a market-buyer needs to pay above the midpoint of the best quotes: 
𝐿𝑆(𝑞) =
∑ 𝑃௝௦𝑄௝௦ + 𝑃௠మ
௦ 𝑄௠మ
௟௦௠మିଵ
௝ୀଵ
𝑞
−
𝑃ଵ௦ + 𝑃ଵௗ
2
 
and 𝑞 = ∑ 𝑄௜௦ + 𝑄௠మ
௟௦௠మିଵ
௜ୀଵ  
where, again, the step 𝑚ଶ  is determined according to ∑ 𝑄௜ଶ
௠మିଵ
௜ୀଵ < 𝑞 ≤ ∑ 𝑄௜
௦௠మ
௜ୀଵ  and 𝑚ଶ  is not 
necessary equal to 𝑚ଵ. 
Considering the price impact and to predict the movement of the mid-quote, a model for buying 
and selling orders is obtained as follows: 
 
𝜀௧∗ =  𝛼଴ + 𝛽଴𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑௧ିଵ + ∑ 𝛽ௗ,௝ଷ௝ୀଵ 𝐿𝐷(𝑗𝑞)௧ିଵ + ∑ 𝛽௦,௝𝐿𝑆(𝑗𝑞)௧ିଵ + 𝜂௧ଷ௝ୀଵ    (3) 
 
The 𝐿𝐷(𝑞) and 𝐿𝑆(𝑞)  represent inverse measures of liquidity. As smaller price impact implies 
better liquidity, the return at 𝑡 should be positively related to 𝐿𝑆(𝑞)௧ିଵ and negatively related 
to 𝐿𝐷(𝑞)௧ିଵ. When there is more liquidity on the demand side, more limit buy orders are 
submitted at crowded buy steps. These limit orders attract more market buy orders that 
consequently drive the price up. Since it is highly improbable that a trader would submit such 
a large market order to consume all and more than the cumulated quantity available at step 3 
on the opposite side, we restricted last regression model considering only the top three levels 
of the limit order book. 
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6.3 EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
Descriptive Statistics 
        Table I 
 
 
 
Table I reports the summary statistics of the average lengths and heights in each step for the 
futures Phelix DE Baseload 2018. Both indicators are presented in percentage terms. The length 
is obtained as the number of shares at each step as a fraction of the total number of shares; 
whereas the height is calculated as the price difference between each step and the previous one, 
as a fraction of the spread between the mid-quote and the final step. For the demand side the 
steps closer to the top of the book are shorter, whereas for the supply side all steps are uniform 
in the length, excluding the first one at the best price level. In both cases we find that the third 
and fourth level offer more depth than any other quotes. Indeed, for both ask and buy side more 
than 84% of the total volume is located beyond the best bid and ask price level. This feature 
highlights the importance of testing the incremental information content of the limit orders 
behind the best bid and ask level. 
This statistics are partially consistent with Cao et al.’s findings (2009) and Duong et al.’s paper 
(2013), respectively in the equity and bond market. As in our research, their studies underline 
the fact that most of the shares are present below the top of the limit order book. However, 
unlike to our energy market situation, in both equity and bond market the steps closer to the top 
of the book are generally longer. A possible explanation of this discrepancy could be the fact 
that we are analysing a futures contract with a very long delivery period, in particular the data 
Steps Buy Sell Buy Sell
1 17,98 19,72 14,97 16,22
2 19,39 22,39 19,75 20,83
3 18,55 19,56 21,67 21,43
4 19,60 18,94 21,84 20,98
5 24,49 19,39 21,76 20,54
Length (%)Height (%)
Descriptive Statistics of the Limit-Order Book Shape 
Table I reports the summary statistics of the average heights and lengths in each step for 
the futures contract Phelix DE Baseload 2018. The length is defined as the number of 
shares at each step as a fraction of the total number of shares. The height is calculated as 
the price difference between each step and its previous step, as a fraction of the spread 
between mid-quote and final step. For the first step, the price of its previous step is set to 
be the mid-quote. 
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available covers a period that is on average a year far away from the start of the power delivery. 
Hence the competition is much lower. 
As far as the height of the demand side is concerned, the top steps are lower (price increments 
are smaller) and they increase monotonically along the order book. On the ask side, once again, 
the step heights are uniform, with the exception of the second quote. 
Overall, we notice a stronger imbalance situation on the buy side with respect to the ask side. 
Hence, we should expect a higher statistical significance of the indicators that summarize the 
shape of the demand side. Moreover, the feature that on average price ticks are smaller on the 
buy side suggests a buying pressure. This is confirmed from the upward trend that characterizes 
the mid-price in the five-month period we studied. 
 
Shot-term Return Predictability of the Limit Order Book 
Table II reports the results of the first set of regressions based on equation (1). We obtain the 
innovation in returns from the AR(5) model. The return innovation is then regressed against the 
unbalanced order book height (𝐻𝑅) and length (𝑄𝑅). The model has been estimated five times; 
each regression includes the limit-order book information up to step 𝑘, where 𝑘 = 1,2,3,4,5. 
The adjusted R-squared indicates that when the variables from the top level are used, the value 
is 5,33% with respect to the 4,90% when only the spread is taken as regressor. However, we 
registered the biggest increase when the quotes of the second step are added, the explanatory 
power increases by 0,89% to 6,22%. Instead, when the lagged book imbalances from steps 3 to 
5 are included, we notice a decrease in fitting the results. The value is even smaller than the 
simple case with the spread as single predictor. 
To test for the joint significance of the coefficients added in each step, a F-test is conducted 
using a 5% significance level. It tests the empirical model versus the constant model; in other 
words, for a given step 𝑘 the null hypothesis is that the coefficients of 𝐻𝑅௞ and 𝑄𝑅௞ are jointly 
zero. The F-statistics affirms that the book imbalance coefficients beyond the top price quote 
are jointly significantly different from zero. This confirms the informativeness of the limit 
orders behind the best price level, even if it appears to be little. 
From the perspective of the coefficients of the regression model, both the 𝑄𝑅 and 𝐻𝑅 indicators 
produce the expected sign in each level, except for 𝐻𝑅ଷ in the fifth quote. 
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Overall, we notice that the majority of the parameters from the third steps onwards is not 
statistically significant. This could explain the decrease in the adjusted R-squared when the step 
3, 4 and 5 are added. 
 
Table II
 
 
 
 
 
The results above do not allow us to confirm or reject our hypothesis. The descriptive statistics, 
previously illustrated, show that in the dataset there is an imbalance in the demand side, whereas 
the supply side is quite uniform. Hence, to better understand the potential information content 
of the LOB, we run the second set of regressions, where the height and length of the steps on 
the demand and supply sides are considered separately. Table III reports the results. 
  
j 1 2 3 4 5
α 0 -0,044*** -0,041*** -0,044*** -0,030*** -0,013*** -0,006**
Spread t-1 24,999*** 24,814*** 25,662*** 17,278*** 7,656*** 4,214***
HR 2,t-1 0,062*** 0,061*** 0,060*** 0,048***
HR 3,t-1 0,010 0,005 -0,003
HR 4,t-1 0,008 0,014***
HR 5,t-1 0,014***
QR 1,t-1 -0,035*** -0,040*** -0,039*** -0,041*** -0,04***
QR 2,t-2 -0,011** -0,014*** -0,015*** -0,011**
QR 3,t-1 -0,001 -0,002 -0,002
QR 4,t-1 -0,005 -0,009*
QR 5,t-1 -0,008*
Adj-R 2 0,0490 0,0533 0,0622 0,0337 0,0178 0,0160
F-stat 509 279 164 58,1 23,1 16,3
Regression analysis of the order book imbalance and returns  
Table II uses the information revealed by the order book in arrears to predict future returns. The regression formula is as follows: 
 
where 𝜀∗ is the innovation in returns estimated by using an AR(5) model, 𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑 is the inside spread, 𝑄𝑅௝is the scaled imbalance in 
quantity at step j, and 𝐻𝑅௝is the scaled imbalance in price at step j. The 𝐴𝑑𝑗𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑅ଶ  and the 𝐹 − 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑠 are reported above. For 
a given 𝑛 step, the null hypothesis of the 𝐹 − 𝑡𝑒𝑠𝑡 is that coefficients of 𝐻𝑅௡ and 𝑄𝑅௡ are jointly zero. 
Note: the coefficient is the result multiplied by 100. 
 𝜀௧∗ = 𝛼଴ + 𝛽଴𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑௧ିଵ + 𝛾଴𝑄𝑅ଵ,௧ିଵ + ෍ 𝛽௝
௡
௝ୀଶ
𝐻𝑅௝,௧ିଵ + ෍ 𝛾௝ 𝑄𝑅௝,௧ିଵ + η௧
௡
௝ୀଶ
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Table III 
 
 
 
 
 
These findings are in line with those of Table II. When only the best level is considered, the 
adjusted R-squared is 5,21%. When the second quote is added, this value registers a huge 
increase of 4,77% and it accounts for 9,98%. Once again, this is the highest explanatory power 
reached in the regression model. From step 3 onwards the value starts to decrease. However, 
contrary to the previous results, the explanatory power at level 3 and 4 is considerably higher 
j 1 2 3 4 5
α 0 -0,044*** -0,047*** -0,048*** -0,044*** -0,029*** -0,009
Spread t-1 24,999*** 24,897*** 27,833*** 23,255*** 12,307*** 0,985
Q d 1,t-1 0,002*** 0,002*** 0,001*** 0,002*** 0,002***
Q d 2,t-1 0,001*** 0,001*** 0,001*** 0,001***
Q d 3,t-1 0,000 0,000 0,000
Q d 4,t-1 0,000 0,000
Q d 5,t-1 0,000
Q s 1,t-1 -0,002*** -0,002*** -0,002*** -0,002*** -0,002***
Q s 2,t-1 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000
Q s 3,t-1 0,000 0,000 0,000
Q s 4,t-1 0,000 0,000
Q s 5,t-1 0,000
H d 2,t-1 -0,572*** -0,0597*** -0,707*** -0,688***
H d 3,t-1 -0,0192*** -0,140*** 0,058***
H d 4,t-1 0,020 0,021
H d 5,t-1 -0,010
H s 2,t-1 0,0414*** 0,601*** 0,626*** 0,504***
H s 3,t-1 0,113** 0,222*** 0,132**
H s 4,t-1 -0,004 0,000
H s 5,t-1 0,026
Adj-R 2 0,0490 0,0521 0,0998 0,0868 0,0785 0,0501
F-stat 509 182 157 85,9 56,1 27,3
Relationship between the order book height, length, and the return
Table III summarizes the results for the following regression model:  
 
where 𝜀∗ is the innovation in returns estimated by using an AR(5) model, 𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑 is the inside spread, 𝑄௝ௗ(𝑄௝௦) is the length of step 
j on the demand (supply) side, and 𝐻௝ௗ(𝐻௝௦) is the height of step j on the demand (supply) side of the limit order book. The 
𝐴𝑑𝑗𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑅ଶ  and the 𝐹 − 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑠 are reported above. For a given 𝑛 step, the null hypothesis of the 𝐹 − 𝑡𝑒𝑠𝑡 is that coefficients 
added in step n are jointly zero. 
Note: the coefficient is the result multiplied by 100. 
 𝜀௧∗ =  𝛼଴ + 𝛽଴𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑௧ିଵ + ෍ 𝛽ௗ,௝
௡
௝ୀଶ
𝐻ௗ௝,௧ିଵ + ෍ 𝛽௦,௝
௡
௝ୀଶ
𝐻௦௝,௧ିଵ + ෍ 𝛾ௗ,௝ 𝑄ௗ௝,௧ିଵ + ෍ 𝛾௦,௝ 𝑄
௦
௝,௧ିଵ + η௧
௡
௝ୀଵ
௡
௝ୀଵ
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than the case where only the best bid and ask level is used. Consistent with the values in Table 
II, the full set of regression pass the F-test and almost the total majority of coefficients estimates 
has the anticipated signs. Indeed, a greater order quantity on the demand (supply) side, 𝑄ௗ (𝑄௦), 
suggests the possibility of attracting more aggressive orders on that side, and, thus, it predicts 
a positive (negative) relationship with the returns. Smaller price difference in selling (buying) 
indicates more aggressive selling orders, which lead to a positive (negative) relationship 
between 𝐻௦ (𝐻) and the returns. In both height and length parameters, the demand coefficients’ 
estimates are statistically more significant than those of the supply. This confirms the inference 
we made from the descriptive table: in our dataset buying orders reveal more information than 
selling orders. 
 
The results of the third set of regressions are provided in Table IV. The imbalances between the 
price impacts of market supply and demand are used as regressors to predict the return for the 
next quote. Using the supply side as an example, the price impact is defined as follows: if the 
demand is hypothesized to provide a quantity 𝑞 of market orders, which subsequently consume 
the limit orders from the supply side and produce changes in transaction prices, and if the supply 
volume is significant enough during the best level, the transaction price should be consistent 
with the supply price for the best quote. Conversely, the transaction cost increases if the supply 
is insufficient. In other words, the price impact measures the liquidity of the demand and supply: 
the greater the price impact, the poorer the liquidity. Hence in the example it means a greater 
chance for a price increment and consequently a positive relationship between the price impact 
and the returns. The opposite scenario produces a negative relationship between the price 
impact on the buy side and the returns. 
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      Table IV 
 
 
 
 
 
The adjusted R-squared is 6,91% when the hypothetical trade size is 𝑞 and it increases to 9,14% 
at 2𝑞. Afterwards the value remains the same; indeed none of the additional coefficients’ 
estimates are statistically significant. All the parameters have the anticipated sign and we can 
reject the null of the F-test. These findings suggest that the returns decrease when the supply 
side is more liquid than the demand side and vice versa. When the imbalance between the 
market demand and supply becomes more severe, due to a higher quantity traded, the chance 
of informed trading increases. Subsequently price changes are more drastic and thus the model 
can fit better the results. 
 
  
j 1 2 3
α 0 -0,044*** -0,035*** -0,022*** -0,022***
Spread t-1 24,999*** 41,190*** 53,470*** 53,499***
LD(1q) t-1 -0,0529*** -0,378*** -0,380***
LD(2q) t-1 -0,55*** -0,546***
LD(3q) t-1 -0,026
LS(1q) t-1 0,000 0,000 0,000
LS(2q) t-1 0,001*** 0,001**
LS(3q) t-1 0,000
Adj-R 2 0,0490 0,0691 0,0914 0,0914
F-stat 509 245 200 143
Relationship between the price impact measures and the return  
Table IV summarizes the results for the following regression model:  
 
where 𝜀∗ is the innovation in returns estimated by using an AR(5) model, 𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑 is the inside 
spread, 𝐿𝐷(𝑗𝑞) and 𝐿𝑆(𝑗𝑞) are the price impact measures on the demand and supply side for 
a hypothetical trade size 𝑞. The 𝐴𝑑𝑗𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑅ଶ  and the 𝐹 − 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑠 are reported above. For 
a given trade size 𝑞, the null hypothesis of the 𝐹 − 𝑡𝑒𝑠𝑡 is that 𝛽ௗ,௝  and 𝛽௦,௝  are jointly zero. 
Note: the coefficient is the result multiplied by 100. 
𝜀௧∗ =  𝛼଴ + 𝛽଴𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑௧ିଵ + ෍ 𝛽ௗ,௝
ଷ
௝ୀଵ
𝐿𝐷(𝑗𝑞)௧ିଵ + ෍ 𝛽௦,௝ 𝐿𝑆(𝑗𝑞)௧ିଵ + η௧
ଷ
௝ୀଵ
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Discussion of the results 
Our findings confirm previous evidence on short-term informativeness of the Limit Order 
Book on future price movements, for instance Bloomfield et al. (2005), Harris and  
Panchapagesan et al. (2005), and Kaniel and Liu (2006). 
Consistent with our hypothesis, the active limit orders beyond the best level, especially those 
submitted from steps 2 to 3, are useful and do provide additional explanatory power. Our 
results are also in line with the analysis of Cao et al. (2009) and Duong et al’s (2013), who 
implemented the same methodology respectively on the equity and bonds market. 
Nevertheless, there is a main difference that could mislead us from affirming the incremental 
information content of the LOB: the adjusted R-squared reaches the highest value at step 2 and 
then it starts to decrease. This feature could be due to the presence of hedgers, traders whose 
main goal is to manage the risk of an unexpected large price movement. Electricity retailers are 
uncertain about how much electricity their residential customers will use at any time of the day 
until they actually turn switches on. Retailers are exposed to joint quantity and price risk on an 
hourly basis given the physical singularity of electricity as a commodity. Hedging allows them 
to lock in prices and margins in advance and it reduces the potential for unanticipated loss. This 
strategy reduces their exposure by shifting that risk to those with opposite risk profiles or to 
investors who are willing to accept the risk in exchange for profit opportunity. Hence, a hedge 
involves establishing a position in the futures that is equal and opposite to a position at risk in 
the physical market. Consequently, it is very likely that the limit orders immediately beyond 
the top level are submitted by informed traders, who are focused on short term profits and have 
a superior knowledge on the next price move. Whereas, at deeper levels, the book is populated 
by limit orders posted by hedgers, who are uninformed and are trying to obtain the best 
favourable price. Hence their limit orders do not provide any valuable information. 
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Further Work 
The summary statistics reported in Table III show a different shape between the demand and 
supply side. In an empirical study, Ranaldo (2004) demonstrated that in an aggressive order 
submission strategy traders behave asymmetrically on the buying and selling side, i.e. their 
choices differ depending on whether the price is decreasing or increasing. This characteristic is 
related to the disposition effect, presented for the first time by Shefrin and Statman (1985). In 
their work, they explain that investors are willing to sell as quickly as possible when they are 
gaining to retain the profit; however, in the case of a loss, they are averse to sell and tend to 
wait for a price reversal. To better investigate whether the agents in the energy futures market 
have different responses to buying and selling behaviours, our empirical analysis could be 
repeated after having divided the return series into upward and downward trend. 
Another interesting supplementary analysis is to find a way to exploit the additional information 
contained in the LOB. Starting from the same methodology we tested, Lin, Tsai, Zheng and 
Lung (2012) proposed a simple trading strategy based on the signals the trader retrieves form 
imbalance measures. In their model they used the 𝐻𝑅 and 𝑄𝑅 indicators, along with two new 
variables for changes in limit order book height and length in previous and following quotes, 
to predict the return on the following quote and establish the strategies. Analysing the Taiwan 
Futures Market they found a positive return even considering transaction costs. 
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7. CONCLUSION 
 
In the first sections of the thesis we presented the limit order book mechanism and the 
evolution of its visualization. We then moved on reviewing quickly the literature on the book 
depth analysis and in the subsection 3.2 a list of variables, that summarize the order book 
shape, has been presented. Section 4 offers the reader an introduction to electricity market and 
explains in detail how a power futures contract works. 
In the last part we tested the limit order book informativeness. In particular, this study 
investigates the incremental information conveyed by the limit orders beyond the best level. 
The empirical model is based on the revealed order quantity (length) and quote (height) in a 
futures energy market limit order book. The objective is to use these imbalance measures to 
forecast the price movement in the following quote. The length and depth of each price level 
were individually measured and repetitively integrated into the regression model. The 
increment in the explanatory power of the model is used to test the amount of additional 
information provided by deeper quotes. Considering the imbalances between the height and 
length of the demand and supply side together, the findings show that only the second best 
level increases the value of the adjusted R-squared of the model. However, if we consider 
separately the imbalance impacts of the demand and supply, we found stronger results. 
The thesis then investigates whether the chance of informed trading is bigger whenever the 
market imbalance becomes more severe. Exploiting the price impact caused by an 
hypothetical trade of size 𝑞, the explanatory power of the regression analysis demonstrated 
that the forecasting ability of the model increases significantly when the market is more 
imbalanced. 
Overall our findings are consistent with the current literature which states that informed traders 
submit limit orders to exploit their information advantage. The study indeed shows that short 
term future return is significantly affected by the information content of the limit order book. 
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APPENDIX A: MATLAB CODE 
 
Innovation in returns 
%load data at the top level 
load basetime.mat 
  
%setting timeorders format 
timeorders.Format='dd/MM/yyyy hh:mm:ss'; 
t=datenum(timeorders); 
  
%round timeorders at 5 min interval 
T = datevec(t); 
T(:,5) = floor(T(:,5) / 5) * 5; 
T=datenum(T); 
  
%calculate Midquote 
MID=(bestAsk+bestBid)/2; 
  
%create Midquote financial time series 
MIDts=fints(T,MID); 
  
%create 5 min interval from 8am to 16pm 
dv = 8/24:1/288:16/24; 
c=datestr(dv); 
c=cellstr(c); 
  
%extract Midquote time series from 8am to 16pm 
MIDts5=fetch(MIDts,'3-Oct-2016','08:00','28-Feb-2017','16:00',1,'d',c); 
  
%calculate returns with a 5 min interval 
MIDts5_vec = fts2mat(MIDts5.series1); 
r=diff(log(MIDts5_vec)); 
  
% Define AR() model 
EstMdl1 = arima('ARLags',1); 
EstMdl2 = arima('ARLags',1:2); 
EstMdl3 = arima('ARLags',1:3); 
EstMdl4 = arima('ARLags',1:4); 
EstMdl5 = arima('ARLags',1:5); 
  
% Preallocate loglikelihood vector 
logL = zeros(5,1); 
  
% Estimate the AR() models 
[~,~,logL(1)] = estimate(EstMdl1,r,'print',false); 
[~,~,logL(2)] = estimate(EstMdl2,r,'print',false); 
[~,~,logL(3)] = estimate(EstMdl3,r,'print',false); 
[~,~,logL(4)] = estimate(EstMdl4,r,'print',false); 
[~,~,logL(5)] = estimate(EstMdl5,r,'print',false); 
  
% AIK criterion 
[aic,bic] = aicbic(logL, [3; 4; 5; 6; 7], 9873*ones(5,1)) 
  
% Extract innovation in return 
m=estimate(EstMdl5,r); 
[E,V]=infer(m,r); 
 
 
Summary Statistics 
%load data 
load dataset.mat 
load InnovationInReturn.mat 
  
%avg Height step on the demand side 
H1d=nanmean(abs(bestBid-MID)); 
H2d=nanmean(abs(bidl2-bestBid)); 
H3d=nanmean(abs(bidl3-bidl2)); 
H4d=nanmean(abs(bidl4-bidl3)); 
H5d=nanmean(abs(bidl5-bidl4)); 
Hd=H1d+H2d+H3d+H4d+H5d; 
  
h1d=100*(H1d/Hd); 
h2d=100*(H2d/Hd); 
h3d=100*(H3d/Hd); 
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h4d=100*(H4d/Hd); 
h5d=100*(H5d/Hd); 
hd=[h1d; h2d; h3d; h4d; h5d]; 
  
%avg Height step on the ask side 
H1s=nanmean(bestAsk-MID); 
H2s=nanmean(askl2-bestAsk); 
H3s=nanmean(askl3-askl2); 
H4s=nanmean(askl4-askl3); 
H5s=nanmean(askl5-askl4); 
Hs=H1s+H2s+H3s+H4s+H5s; 
  
h1s=100*(H1s/Hs); 
h2s=100*(H2s/Hs); 
h3s=100*(H3s/Hs); 
h4s=100*(H4s/Hs); 
h5s=100*(H5s/Hs); 
hs=[h1s; h2s; h3s; h4s; h5s]; 
  
%avg Lenght step on the demand side 
Q1d=nanmean(bidvol1); 
Q2d=nanmean(bidvol2); 
Q3d=nanmean(bidvol3); 
Q4d=nanmean(bidvol4); 
Q5d=nanmean(bidvol5); 
Qd=Q1d+Q2d+Q3d+Q4d+Q5d; 
  
q1d=100*(Q1d/Qd); 
q2d=100*(Q2d/Qd); 
q3d=100*(Q3d/Qd); 
q4d=100*(Q4d/Qd); 
q5d=100*(Q5d/Qd); 
qd=[q1d; q2d; q3d; q4d; q5d]; 
  
%avg Lenght step on the ask side 
Q1s=nanmean(askvol1); 
Q2s=nanmean(askvol2); 
Q3s=nanmean(askvol3); 
Q4s=nanmean(askvol4); 
Q5s=nanmean(askvol5); 
Qs=Q1s+Q2s+Q3s+Q4s+Q5s; 
  
q1s=100*(Q1s/Qs); 
q2s=100*(Q2s/Qs); 
q3s=100*(Q3s/Qs); 
q4s=100*(Q4s/Qs); 
q5s=100*(Q5s/Qs); 
qs=[q1s; q2s; q3s; q4s; q5s]; 
  
%table 
Steps = {'step 1';'step 2';'step 3';'step 4';'step 5'}; 
Height=[hd, hs]; 
Lenght=[qd, qs]; 
format bank 
SummaryStatistic=table(Height, Lenght, 'RowNames', Steps) 
writetable(SummaryStatistic,'SummaryStatistics.xlsx','WriteRowNames',1); 
 
 
First set of regressions 
%load data 
load SummaryStatistics.mat 
  
%calculate spread time series at 5 min interval 
spread=(bestAsk-bestBid)./(bestAsk+bestBid); 
spreadts=fints(T,spread); 
spreadts5=fetch(spreadts,'3-Oct-2016','08:00','28-Feb-2017','16:00',1,'d',c); 
spreadts5_vec = fts2mat(spreadts5.series1(1:end-1)); 
  
%imbalance in the height 
HR2=((askl2-bestAsk)-abs(bidl2-bestBid))./((askl2-bestAsk)+abs(bidl2-bestBid)); 
HR2ts=fints(T,HR2); 
HR2ts5=fetch(HR2ts,'3-Oct-2016','08:00','28-Feb-2017','16:00',1,'d',c); 
HR2ts5_vec = fts2mat(HR2ts5.series1(1:end-1)); 
  
HR3=((askl3-askl2)-abs(bidl3-bidl2))./((askl3-askl2)+abs(bidl3-bidl2)); 
HR3ts=fints(T,HR3); 
HR3ts5=fetch(HR3ts,'3-Oct-2016','08:00','28-Feb-2017','16:00',1,'d',c); 
HR3ts5_vec = fts2mat(HR3ts5.series1(1:end-1)); 
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HR4=((askl4-askl3)-abs(bidl4-bidl3))./((askl4-askl3)+abs(bidl4-bidl3)); 
HR4ts=fints(T,HR4); 
HR4ts5=fetch(HR4ts,'3-Oct-2016','08:00','28-Feb-2017','16:00',1,'d',c); 
HR4ts5_vec = fts2mat(HR4ts5.series1(1:end-1)); 
  
HR5=((askl5-askl4)-abs(bidl5-bidl4))./((askl5-askl4)+abs(bidl5-bidl4)); 
HR5ts=fints(T,HR5); 
HR5ts5=fetch(HR5ts,'3-Oct-2016','08:00','28-Feb-2017','16:00',1,'d',c); 
HR5ts5_vec = fts2mat(HR5ts5.series1(1:end-1)); 
  
%imbalance in the lenght 
QR1=(askvol1-bidvol1)./(askvol1+bidvol1); 
QR1ts=fints(T,QR1); 
QR1ts5=fetch(QR1ts,'3-Oct-2016','08:00','28-Feb-2017','16:00',1,'d',c); 
QR1ts5_vec = fts2mat(QR1ts5.series1(1:end-1)); 
  
QR2=(askvol2-bidvol2)./(askvol2+bidvol2); 
QR2ts=fints(T,QR2); 
QR2ts5=fetch(QR2ts,'3-Oct-2016','08:00','28-Feb-2017','16:00',1,'d',c); 
QR2ts5_vec = fts2mat(QR2ts5.series1(1:end-1)); 
  
QR3=(askvol3-bidvol3)./(askvol3+bidvol3); 
QR3ts=fints(T,QR3); 
QR3ts5=fetch(QR3ts,'3-Oct-2016','08:00','28-Feb-2017','16:00',1,'d',c); 
QR3ts5_vec = fts2mat(QR3ts5.series1(1:end-1)); 
  
QR4=(askvol4-bidvol4)./(askvol4+bidvol4); 
QR4ts=fints(T,QR4); 
QR4ts5=fetch(QR4ts,'3-Oct-2016','08:00','28-Feb-2017','16:00',1,'d',c); 
QR4ts5_vec = fts2mat(QR4ts5.series1(1:end-1)); 
  
QR5=(askvol5-bidvol5)./(askvol5+bidvol5); 
QR5ts=fints(T,QR5); 
QR5ts5=fetch(QR5ts,'3-Oct-2016','08:00','28-Feb-2017','16:00',1,'d',c); 
QR5ts5_vec = fts2mat(QR5ts5.series1(1:end-1)); 
  
%first set of regressions 
X = [spreadts5_vec, QR1ts5_vec]; 
lm1 = fitlm(X,E); 
X2 = [spreadts5_vec, HR2ts5_vec, QR1ts5_vec, QR2ts5_vec]; 
lm2 = fitlm(X2,E); 
X3 = [spreadts5_vec, HR2ts5_vec, HR3ts5_vec, QR1ts5_vec, QR2ts5_vec, QR3ts5_vec]; 
lm3 = fitlm(X3,E); 
X4 = [spreadts5_vec, HR2ts5_vec, HR3ts5_vec, HR4ts5_vec, QR1ts5_vec, QR2ts5_vec, QR3ts5_vec, 
QR4ts5_vec]; 
lm4 = fitlm(X4,E); 
X5 = [spreadts5_vec, HR2ts5_vec, HR3ts5_vec, HR4ts5_vec, HR5ts5_vec,... 
    QR1ts5_vec, QR2ts5_vec, QR3ts5_vec, QR4ts5_vec, QR5ts5_vec]; 
lm5 = fitlm(X5,E); 
 
Second set of regressions 
%load data 
load ImbalanceMeasures.mat 
  
%Height and Length parameters 
HD2=abs(bidl2-bestBid); 
h2=fints(T,HD2); 
hd2=fetch(h2,'3-Oct-2016','08:00','28-Feb-2017','16:00',1,'d',c); 
h2v = fts2mat(hd2.series1(1:end-1)); 
  
HD3=abs(bidl3-bidl2); 
h3=fints(T,HD3); 
hd3=fetch(h3,'3-Oct-2016','08:00','28-Feb-2017','16:00',1,'d',c); 
h3v = fts2mat(hd3.series1(1:end-1)); 
  
HD4=abs(bidl4-bidl3); 
h4=fints(T,HD4); 
hd4=fetch(h4,'3-Oct-2016','08:00','28-Feb-2017','16:00',1,'d',c); 
h4v = fts2mat(hd4.series1(1:end-1)); 
  
HD5=abs(bidl5-bidl4); 
h5=fints(T,HD5); 
hd5=fetch(h5,'3-Oct-2016','08:00','28-Feb-2017','16:00',1,'d',c); 
h5v = fts2mat(hd5.series1(1:end-1)); 
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HS2=askl2-bestAsk; 
h2s=fints(T,HS2); 
hs2=fetch(h2s,'3-Oct-2016','08:00','28-Feb-2017','16:00',1,'d',c); 
h2sv = fts2mat(hs2.series1(1:end-1)); 
  
HS3=askl3-askl2; 
h3s=fints(T,HS3); 
hs3=fetch(h3s,'3-Oct-2016','08:00','28-Feb-2017','16:00',1,'d',c); 
h3sv = fts2mat(hs3.series1(1:end-1)); 
  
HS4=askl4-askl3; 
h4s=fints(T,HS4); 
hs4=fetch(h4s,'3-Oct-2016','08:00','28-Feb-2017','16:00',1,'d',c); 
h4sv = fts2mat(hs4.series1(1:end-1)); 
  
HS5=askl5-askl4; 
h5s=fints(T,HS5); 
hs5=fetch(h5s,'3-Oct-2016','08:00','28-Feb-2017','16:00',1,'d',c); 
h5sv = fts2mat(hs5.series1(1:end-1)); 
  
QD1=fints(T,bidvol1); 
q1d=fetch(QD1,'3-Oct-2016','08:00','28-Feb-2017','16:00',1,'d',c); 
q1v = fts2mat(q1d.series1(1:end-1)); 
  
QD2=fints(T,bidvol2); 
q2d=fetch(QD2,'3-Oct-2016','08:00','28-Feb-2017','16:00',1,'d',c); 
q2v = fts2mat(q2d.series1(1:end-1)); 
  
QD3=fints(T,bidvol3); 
q3d=fetch(QD3,'3-Oct-2016','08:00','28-Feb-2017','16:00',1,'d',c); 
q3v = fts2mat(q3d.series1(1:end-1)); 
  
QD4=fints(T,bidvol4); 
q4d=fetch(QD4,'3-Oct-2016','08:00','28-Feb-2017','16:00',1,'d',c); 
q4v = fts2mat(q4d.series1(1:end-1)); 
  
QD5=fints(T,bidvol5); 
q5d=fetch(QD5,'3-Oct-2016','08:00','28-Feb-2017','16:00',1,'d',c); 
q5v = fts2mat(q5d.series1(1:end-1)); 
  
QS1=fints(T,askvol1); 
q1s=fetch(QS1,'3-Oct-2016','08:00','28-Feb-2017','16:00',1,'d',c); 
q1sv = fts2mat(q1s.series1(1:end-1)); 
  
QS2=fints(T,askvol2); 
q2s=fetch(QS2,'3-Oct-2016','08:00','28-Feb-2017','16:00',1,'d',c); 
q2sv = fts2mat(q2s.series1(1:end-1)); 
  
QS3=fints(T,askvol3); 
q3s=fetch(QS3,'3-Oct-2016','08:00','28-Feb-2017','16:00',1,'d',c); 
q3sv = fts2mat(q3s.series1(1:end-1)); 
  
QS4=fints(T,askvol4); 
q4s=fetch(QS4,'3-Oct-2016','08:00','28-Feb-2017','16:00',1,'d',c); 
q4sv = fts2mat(q4s.series1(1:end-1)); 
  
QS5=fints(T,askvol5); 
q5s=fetch(QS5,'3-Oct-2016','08:00','28-Feb-2017','16:00',1,'d',c); 
q5sv = fts2mat(q5s.series1(1:end-1)); 
  
%second set of regression 
X6 = [spreadts5_vec, q1v, q1sv]; 
lm6 = fitlm(X6,E); 
X7 = [spreadts5_vec, q1v, q2v, q1sv, q2sv, h2v, h2sv]; 
lm7 = fitlm(X7,E); 
X8 = [spreadts5_vec, q1v, q2v, q3v, q1sv, q2sv, q3sv, h2v, h3v, h2sv, h3sv]; 
lm8 = fitlm(X8,E); 
X9 = [spreadts5_vec, q1v, q2v, q3v, q4v, q1sv, q2sv, q3sv, q4sv, h2v, h3v, h4v, h2sv, h3sv, 
h4sv]; 
lm9 = fitlm(X9,E); 
X10 = [spreadts5_vec, q1v, q2v, q3v, q4v, q5v, q1sv, q2sv, q3sv, q4sv, q5sv,... 
    h2v, h3v, h4v, h5v, h2sv, h3sv, h4sv,h5sv]; 
lm10 = fitlm(X10,E); 
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LD and LS measures 
%load data 
load ImbalanceMeasures.mat 
  
cum_bvol=cumsum(bidvolume,2, 'omitnan'); 
  
for ii=1:size(bidvol1) 
    if cum_bvol(ii,1)>7 
        f(ii)=1; 
    else f(ii)=0; 
    end 
end 
f=f'; 
  
for ii=1:size(bidvol1) 
    if cum_bvol(ii,2)>7 
        n(ii)=2; 
    else n(ii)=0; 
    end 
end 
n=n'; 
  
for ii=1:size(bidvol1) 
    if cum_bvol(ii,3)>7 
        o(ii)=3; 
    else o(ii)=0; 
    end 
end 
o=o'; 
  
for ii=1:size(bidvol1) 
    if cum_bvol(ii,4)>7 
        p(ii)=4; 
    else p(ii)=0; 
    end 
end 
p=p'; 
  
A=[f,n,o,p]; 
A=sum(A,2); 
  
k = find(isnan(bidvol1))'; bidvol1(k) = 0; bidvol1(isnan(bidvol1)) = 0; 
k = find(isnan(bidvol2))'; bidvol2(k) = 0; bidvol2(isnan(bidvol2)) = 0; 
k = find(isnan(bidvol3))'; bidvol3(k) = 0; bidvol3(isnan(bidvol3)) = 0; 
k = find(isnan(bidvol4))'; bidvol4(k) = 0; bidvol4(isnan(bidvol4)) = 0; 
bl1=bidvol1; 
bl2=bl1+bidvol2; 
bl3=bl2+bidvol3; 
bl4=bl3+bidvol4; 
  
for ii=1:size(bidvol1) 
    if A(ii)== 7 
        ql(ii)= 7 - bl2(ii); 
    elseif A(ii)== 9 
        ql(ii) = 7 -bl1(ii); 
    else 
        ql(ii)=0; 
    end 
end 
ql=ql'; 
 
for ii=1:size(A) 
    if A(ii) == 4 
        LD(ii) = MID(ii) - [(bidvol3(ii)*bidl3(ii) + bidvol2(ii)*bidl2(ii) + 
bidvol1(ii)*bestBid(ii))/(bl3(ii))]; 
    elseif A(ii)==7 
        LD(ii) = MID(ii) - [(ql(ii)*bidl3(ii) + bidvol2(ii)*bidl2(ii) + 
bidvol1(ii)*bestBid(ii))/(bl2(ii)+ql(ii))] ; 
    elseif A(ii)==9 
        LD(ii) = MID(ii) - [(ql(ii)*bidl2(ii) + bidvol1(ii)*bestBid(ii))/(bl1(ii)+ql(ii))] ; 
    elseif A(ii)== 10 
        LD(ii)= MID(ii) - [(7*bestBid(ii))/7]; 
    else 
        LD(ii)= 0; 
    end 
end 
LD=LD'; 
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LDts=fints(T,LD); 
LDts5=fetch(LDts,'3-Oct-2016','08:00','28-Feb-2017','16:00',1,'d',c); 
LD7 = fts2mat(LDts5.series1(1:end-1)); 
 
cum_avol=cumsum(askvolume,2, 'omitnan'); 
  
for ii=1:size(askvol1) 
    if cum_avol(ii,1)>21 
        w(ii)=1; 
    else w(ii)=0; 
    end 
end 
w=w'; 
  
for ii=1:size(askvol1) 
    if cum_avol(ii,2)>21 
        g(ii)=2; 
    else g(ii)=0; 
    end 
end 
g=g'; 
  
for ii=1:size(askvol1) 
    if cum_avol(ii,3)>21 
        u(ii)=3; 
    else u(ii)=0; 
    end 
end 
u=u'; 
  
for ii=1:size(askvol1) 
    if cum_avol(ii,4)>21 
        z(ii)=4; 
    else z(ii)=0; 
    end 
end 
z=z'; 
  
B=[w,g,u,z]; 
B=sum(B,2); 
  
k = find(isnan(askvol1))'; askvol1(k) = 0; askvol1(isnan(askvol1)) = 0; 
k = find(isnan(askvol2))'; askvol2(k) = 0; askvol2(isnan(askvol2)) = 0; 
k = find(isnan(askvol3))'; askvol3(k) = 0; askvol3(isnan(askvol3)) = 0; 
k = find(isnan(askvol4))'; askvol4(k) = 0; askvol4(isnan(askvol4)) = 0; 
al1=askvol1; 
al2=al1+askvol2; 
al3=al2+askvol3; 
al4=al3+askvol4; 
  
for ii=1:size(askvol1) 
    if B(ii)== 7 
        ql(ii)= 21 - al2(ii); 
    elseif B(ii)== 9 
        ql(ii) = 21 -al1(ii); 
    else 
        ql(ii)=0; 
    end 
end 
ql=ql'; 
  
for ii=1:size(bidvol1) 
    if B(ii) == 4 
        LS(ii) = [(askvol3(ii)*askl3(ii) + askvol2(ii)*askl2(ii) + 
askvol1(ii)*bestAsk(ii))/(al2(ii)+ql(ii))] - MID(ii); 
    elseif B(ii)==7 
        LS(ii) = [(ql(ii)*askl3(ii) + askvol2(ii)*askl2(ii) + 
askvol1(ii)*bestAsk(ii))/(al2(ii)+ql(ii))] - MID(ii); 
    elseif B(ii)==9 
        LS(ii) = [(ql(ii)*askl2(ii) + askvol1(ii)*bestAsk(ii))/(al1(ii)+ql(ii))] - MID(ii); 
    elseif B(ii)==10 
        LS(ii)= [(21*bestAsk(ii))/21] - MID(ii); 
    else 
        LS(ii)= 0; 
    end 
end 
LS=LS'; 
  
LSts=fints(T,LS); 
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LSts5=fetch(LSts,'3-Oct-2016','08:00','28-Feb-2017','16:00',1,'d',c); 
LS21= fts2mat(LSts5.series1(1:end-1)); 
 
Third set of regressions 
%load data 
load ImbalanceMeasures.mat 
load LRImb.mat 
  
X14 = [spreadts5_vec, LD7, LS7]; 
lm14 = fitlm(X14,E) 
  
X15 = [spreadts5_vec, LD7, LD14, LS7, LS14]; 
lm15 = fitlm(X15,E) 
  
X16 = [spreadts5_vec, LD7, LD14, LD21, LS7, LS14, LS21]; 
lm16 = fitlm(X16,E) 
  
60 
 
 
  
 
 
REFERENCES 
 
Anand, A., & Martell, T. (2001). ‘Informed’ limit order trading. Working paper 
 
Baruch, S. (2005). Who beneﬁts from an open limit-order book? Journal of Business, 78, 1267–
1306 
Biais, B., Hillion, P., & Spatt, C. (1995). An empirical analysis of the limit order book and the 
order flow in the Paris bourse. Journal of Finance, 50(5), 1655-1689 
 
Bloomﬁeld, R., O’Hara, M., & Saar, G. (2005). The “make or take” decision in an electronic 
market: Evidence on the evolution of liquidity. Journal of Financial Economics, 75, 165–199 
 
Boehmer, E., Saar, G., & Yu, L. (2005). Lifting the veil: An analysis of pre-trade transparency 
at the NYSE. Journal of Finance, 60, 783–815 
 
Bortoli, L., Frino, A., Jarnecic, E., Johnstone, D. (2006). Limit order book transparency, 
execution risk, and market liquidity: evidence from the Sydney Futures Exchange. Journal of 
Futures Markets, 26, 1147-1167 
 
Burger, M., Graeber, B., Schindlmayr, G. (2014). Managing Energy Risk: A Practical Guide 
for Risk Management in Power, Gas and Other Energy Markets, Second Edition 
 
Cao, C., Hansch, O., & Wang, X. (2009). The information content of an open limit-order book. 
Journal of Futures Markets, 29(1), 16-41 
 
Chakravarty, S. and Holden, C.W. (1995). An integrated model of market and limit orders. J. 
Financ. Intermed., 4, 213–241 
 
Cont, R., Kukanov, A., & Stoikov, S. (2011). The price impact of order book events. 
arXiv:1011.6402 
 
Copeland, T.E., & Galai, D. (1983). Information effects on the bid-ask spread. J. Finance, 38, 
1457–1469 
 
Danielsson, J., Payne, R.G. & Luo, J. (2002). Exchange Rate Determination and Inter-Market 
Order Flow Eﬀects. London School of Economics, mimeo. 
Duong, H.N., & Kalev, P.S. (2008). Order Book Slope and Price Volatility. Working Paper 
Duong, H.N., Kalev, P.S. & Sun, Y. (2013). Pre-trade Transparency and the Information 
Content of the Limit Order Book. Market Microstructure and Nonlinear Dynamics - Keeping 
Financial Crisis in Context, edited by Dufrénot, G., Jawadi, F. & Louhichi, W. (2014). Springer-
Verlag 
 
Evans, M.D.D. & Lyons, R.K. (2006). Understanding Order Flow. International Journal of 
Finance and Economics 11, 3-23 
 
Foucault, T. (1999). Order ﬂow composition and trading costs in a dynamic limit order market. 
Journal of Financial Markets, 2, 99–134 
 
 
 
Glosten, L. (1994). Is the electronic open limit order book inevitable? Journal of Finance, 49, 
1127–1161 
 
Gould, M.D., Porter, M.A., Williams, S., McDonald, M., Fenn, D. & Howison, S. (2013). Limit 
Order Books. Quantitative Finance 13 (11), 1709-1742 
 
Grifﬁths, M., Smith, B., Turnbull, A., & White, R. (2000). The costs and determinants of order 
aggressiveness. Journal of Financial Economics, 56, 65–88 
 
Harris, L. (1990). Liquidity, trading rules, and electronic trading systems, New York 
University. Monograph series in ﬁnance and economics, Monograph 1990–4 
 
Handa, P. &  Schwartz, R.A. (1996). Limit Order Trading. Journal of Finance, vol. 51, issue 5, 
1835-61  
 
Handa, P., Schwartz, R.A. & Tiwari, A. (2003). Quote setting and price formation in an order 
driven market. Journal of Financial Markets, vol. 6, issue 4, 461-489  
 
Harris, L., & Panchapagesan, V. (2005). The information-content of the limit order book: 
Evidence from NYSE specialist trading decisions. Journal of Financial Markets, 8, 25–67 
 
Hautsch, N. & Huang, R. (2011). The market impact of a limit order. J. Econ. Dyn. Control, 
36, 501–522 
 
Holliﬁeld, B., Miller, R., & Sandas, P. (2004). Empirical analysis of limit order markets. 
Review of Economic Studies, 71, 1027–1063 
 
Kaniel, R., & Liu, H. (2006). So what orders do informed traders use? Journal of Business, 79 
 
Latza, T. & Payne, R. (2010). Measuring the Information Content of Limit Order Flows. 
Working paper 
 
Lin, W., Tsai. S, Zheng, Z. & Lung, P. (2012). The Information content of the limit-order book 
and the corresponding trading strategy. Working Paper 
 
Madhavan, A., Potter, D., & Weaver, D. (2005). Should securities markets be transparent? 
Journal of Financial Markets, 8, 265–287 
 
Næs R., Skjeltorp J. (2006). Order book characteristics and the volume-volatility relation: 
Empirical evidence from a limit order market, Journal of Financial Markets, vol. 9, issue 4, 
408-432  
 
Parlour, C. (1998). Price dynamics in limit order markets. Review of Financial Studies, 11, 
789–816 
 
Ranaldo, A. (2004). Order aggressiveness in limit order book markets. Journal of Financial 
Markets, 7, 53–74 
 
Rock, K. (1996). The specialist’s order book and price anomalies. Working Paper. Harvard 
University 
 
 
 
Seppi, D. (1997). Liquidity provision with limit orders and a strategic specialist. Review of 
Financial Studies, 10, 103–150 
 
Sager, M. & Taylor, M. (2008). Commercially available order ﬂow data and exchange rate 
movements: Caveat emptor. Journal of Money, Credit and Banking 40(4), 583–625 
 
Samuelson, P. (1965). Rational theory of warrant pricing. Indust. Management Rev., 6:13–32 
 
Shefrin, H., & Statman, M. (1985). The disposition to sell winners too early and losers too long: 
Theory and evidence. Journal of Finance, 40(3), 777-790 
www.eex.com – European Energy Exchange 
